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BOOKS, SUSAN M. Ed.D Contemporary Educational Criticism: A 
Critique. (1992) Directed by Dr. David E. Purpel. 180 pp. 
This dissertation explores issues in the theory and practice of 
contemporary educational criticism that have arisen in the wake of the 
breakup of the curriculum field in the 1960s and 1970s. This upheaval, I 
argue, reflects a broader questioning across the humanities and the social 
sciences that has challenged the legitimacy of critics' claims to authority 
and has eroded the boundaries of disciplinary critique. 
The dissertation develops a critique of John Mann's model of 
curriculum criticism and critiques the practice of educational criticism as 
exemplified in works representative of the dominant strains of 
contemporary educational criticism: 1) the geopolitically- and culturally-
focused criticism of texts such as the National Commission on Excellence in 
Education's A Nation at Risk and Allan Bloom's The Closing of the 
American Mind, and 2) the critical pedagogy literature, which critiques the 
anti-egalitarianism of critics such as Bloom and the NCEE. 
Conclusions are 1) that for educational critics to recognize implication 
in their own criticism would improve the practice across the political 
spectrum by highlighting the fundamentally relational and so moral nature 
of this work, and 2) that using Paulo Freire's thought as a metaphor for 
educational criticism would improve the practice by helping to shift the 
focus from the need to legitimate this work to the need to socialize it. 
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In putting pen to paper, or today, more accurately if less 
euphoniously, touching finger to keyboard, women writers gain access to 
their subjects by beginning a meditation on the meaning of the subject. The 
canonical example in Women's literature, is, of course, A Room of One's 
Own: 
The title women and fiction might mean, and you may have 
meant it to mean, women and what they are like, or it might 
mean women and the fiction that they write; or it might mean 
women and the fiction that is written about them; or it might 
mean that somehow all three are inextricably mixed together 
and you want me to consider them in that light. 
Such meditations are followed not infrequently by the woman 
writer's announcing the impossibility of her project: 
I should never be able to come to a conclusion. I should never 
be able to fulfill what is, I understand, the first duty of a 
lecturer — to hand you after an hour's discourse a nugget of 
pure truth to wrap between the pages of your notebooks and 
keep on the mantlepiece for ever ... I have shirked the duty of 
coming to a conclusion upon these two questions — women 
and fiction remain, so far as I am concerned, unsolved 
problems. 
So what does the woman writer do instead? She changes the subject, 
of course. 
— Jo Anne Pagano 
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Pagano (1992) goes on to say that what looks like changing the 
subject isn't necessarily that. It may be a way of showing "the tyranny of 
large Subjects, the tendentiousness of grand conclusions, and the 
presumptuousness of those who take on Subjects to draw conclusions — 
nuggets of gold for our mantlepieces" (p. 107). Virginia Woolf, for example, 
doesn't change the subject of women and fiction so much as show how it is 
made. 
I began this dissertation, I admit, with just such presumptuousness. I 
intended to assert that human suffering in the world has attained obscene 
proportions; that, given this reality, nothing should take precedence over 
the need to work as thoughtfully and diligently as possible to alleviate the 
misery; and that, consequently, educational critics should throw their 
particular energies and insights into the struggle against the persistence of 
unnecessary suffering. My own contribution to this effort was to have been 
to help define the practice of educational criticism in such a way as to 
discredit criticism not aligned with the struggle against such suffering. 
That is what I intended to do, but it is not what I have done - which 
is not to say that I have come to believe that educational criticism ought not 
be aligned centrally with the struggle against human suffering. On the 
contrary (and arguments about "the tyranny of large Subjects" 
notwithstanding), I believe this work should be so aligned.1 However, the 
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value of delineating a concept of educational criticism or of constructing a 
theoretical framework that, at a definitional level, requires this no longer 
seems so clear to me. 
Indeed, a whole host of unwieldy questions arose for me that called 
into question what was to have been my whole project ~ questions such as 
these: Given that suffering is bad (a proposition on which I believe there is 
widespread agreement), what does this imply about the actual work of 
educational criticism? Ought educational critics merely announce and/or 
denounce the suffering apart from concerns about the persuasiveness of 
their announcements and denouncements? Or, ought they, either instead or 
also, contextualize the suffering and trace its etiology to show readers 
where at least they think the suffering comes from and how it relates to 
their lives? That is, ought the project of educational criticism be essentially 
explanatory? Or, ought critics self-consciously try to persuade others to 
engage themselves in the struggle in which, as far as they are concerned, 
their own work is grounded? And, if so, how is this done ~ through 
denunciation and/or explanation or through attempts at consciousness-
raising? 
I also did not deal directly with these methodological questions, in 
part because all sorts of unwieldy emotions (frustration, anxiety, feelings of 
being hopelessly lost in an artificial world) welled up and got in the way. 
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Thrown back on myself in this way, I learned (again) that the questioner 
really cannot be factored out of the question. Consequently, I now believe 
that what I initially envisioned as a dialectic between the work, of 
educational criticism and the persistence of unnecessary suffering should 
instead be seen as an interplay among the actual work of criticism, the 
social reality of suffering and injustice, and the critic her or himself. 
This dissertation, therefore, reflects my effort to gain some 
understanding of issues of educational criticism and responsibility, to hold 
together intellectual insight and physical and emotional pain, and to come 
to terms with the uncomfortable realization that theoretical exploration not 
only can stray a long way from the flesh and blood of human suffering, but 
can even provide a certain escape or diversion from the pain of it all. As I 
simultaneously have become increasingly familiar with some fairly 
sophisticated theory (critical social theory, literary theory, and 
epistemological conundrums) and with the worsening plights of those who 
suffer most in this society (poor children, beaten-down women, people of 
color, old people with no money) I have struggled to hold together 
intellectual interests and moral sensibilities that have seemed at times to 
drift dangerously apart. Gaining some understanding of the ideological 
constructs that prop up systems of injustice and responding to the depths of 
pain and hopelessness that constrain the lives of so many people is not 
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necessarily the same thing. As Jonathan Kozol (1991) remarks about a class 
of "gifted" students discussing issues of justice, it is often true that 
"questions of unfairness feel more like a geometric problems than a matter 
of humanity or conscience" (p. 127). 
Where does this leave educational criticism? Ought educational 
critics frame the "questions of unfairness," solve the "geometric problems," 
or speak to their own and their readers' consciences? My students often 
ask, with annoyance and even anger, why some of the educational critics 
whose writing they read do not "go teach in the schools themselves" ~ the 
not-very-subtle suggestion being that those who stand on the outside and 
complain, however insightfully, don't help. Such a response to educational 
criticism can, of course, be called "resistance" and left at that. But I don't 
think it should be. I believe the annoyance and anger that educational 
criticism (especially the good criticism) sometimes provokes in students 
reflects a legitimate insistence that criticism should answer for or justify 
itself and come to terms with its function in the broader society and culture. 
This question of the social function of criticism and of the social 
responsibility of the critic is, of course, hardly new. It is, however, a 
question that takes on a heightened significance as educational criticism 
becomes redefined as a form of social and cultural criticism — which, I 
argue in Chapter 1, is what has happened, in practice if not yet in theory. 
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The effort to reconceptualize educational criticism takes place in the 
context of a sweeping intellectual ferment across the humanities and the 
social sciences. As disciplinary boundaries have been eroded and the social 
constructedness of the subjects they were supposed to contain exposed, 
ideas about what critics actually critique also have come under scrutiny. 
Looming behind such questions are, among other paradigmatic theorists, 
Antonio Gramsci, with his ideas about the importance of the organic 
intellectual, and Michel Foucault, with his thoughts about the significance 
of the strategic intellectual. Both constructs have influenced the 
development of educational theory and criticism. 
I situate my own questions about educational criticism in the context 
of Gramsci's and Foucaulf s ideas about what intellectuals ought to be 
doing (i.e., their social function), so let me, briefly, review their thoughts 
about intellectual work. Gramsci's (1971) notion of the organic intellectual 
rests on a distinction between those intellectuals whose work is self­
consciously integral to the social and political struggles of the day and 
those whose activity, on the surface at least, seems unrelated to such 
activity: 
In the first place there are the "traditional" professional 
intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in the 
interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but 
derives ultimately from past and present class relations and 
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conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. 
Secondly, there are the "organic" intellectuals, the thinking and 
organising element of a particular fundamental social class. 
These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their 
profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, 
than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of 
the class to which they organically belong (p. 3). 
Gramsci's great insight, for me, is that we all could function this way, that 
is, as organic intellectuals (assuming, of course, that Gramsci meant to 
include the women we still prefer to call "men" in his project). Intellectual 
work is not something reserved for the few, but rather, at some level of 
consciousness, is work shared by all: 
Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on 
some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a "philosopher," 
an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular 
conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, 
and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world 
or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of 
thought (p. 9). 
Consequently, since all people potentially are intellectuals, "the problem of 
creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists therefore in the critical 
elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in everyone at a certain 
degree of development" (p. 9). But who is to do this critical work of 
elaborating the intellectual activity that already exists? Presumably those 
organic intellectuals who see themselves in the role of teacher — and here, it 
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seems, is where Foucault takes issue with Gramsci's conceptualization of 
the task of the intellectual. 
Foucault (1977) counterposes a notion of the strategic intellectual 
against that of the universal intellectual, which, he suggests, is what lies 
behind the idea of "an 'organic' intellectual acting as the spokesman for a 
global organisation" (pp. 125-26). He explains: 
For a long period, the "left" intellectual spoke and was 
acknowledged the right of speaking in the capacity of master 
of truth and justice.... To be an intellectual meant something 
like being the consciousness/conscience of us all.... Just as the 
proletariat, by the necessity of its historical situation, is the 
bearer of the universal (but its immediate, unreflected bearer, 
barely conscious of itself as such), so the intellectual, through 
his moral, theoretical and political choice, aspires to be the 
bearer of this universality in its conscious, elaborated form (p. 
126). 
Intellectuals are no longer called upon to play the role epitomized "by the 
writer, the bearer of values and significations in which all can recognise 
themselves" (Foucault, 1977, p. 128). Rather, the scientific expert stands as 
the exemplar of a new intellectual function: 
The figure in which the functions and prestige of this new 
intellectual are concentrated is no longer that of the "writer of 
genius," but that of the "absolute savant," no longer he who 
bears the values of all, opposes the unjust sovereign or his 
ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave. 
It is rather he who, along with a handful of others, has at his 
disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it, 
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power which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 129). 
Foucault's great insight, for me, is that the question to be asked may not be 
how best to raise the consciousness of others (or unmask ideology or win 
what Cornel West calls the hermeneutic war), but rather where the real 
battles over power, which is to say "truth," are being fought: 
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to 
criticise the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, 
or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by 
a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of 
constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not 
changing people's consciousness ~ or whaf s in their heads ~ 
but the political, economic, institutional regime of the 
production of truth (p. 133). 
I understand this as a call for political relevance. If what counts as true is a 
function of who has the largest nuclear arsenal, I think Foucault is saying, 
this is where intellectuals must situate their work. 
The literary/social critic Terry Eagleton (1983) acknowledges a debt 
to Foucault, and takes as his starting point the politically strategic 
orientation Foucault advocates: "As far as the object of study goes, what 
you decide to examine depends very much on the practical situation" (pp. 
210-11). Eagleton has done for literary criticism what, I argue in Chapter 1, 
needs to be done for educational criticism — which is, first, to call into 
question the idea that there is "an object named literature," which critics are 
invited to critique, and then to question a conceptualization of criticism that 
defines this work accordingly. It is not true, Eagleton argues, that literary 
critics critique literary texts and so concern themselves only with literary 
matters — in part because what counts as literature is always thoroughly 
implicated in social and political decision-making. Similarly, in the field of 
education, there is no such thing as "an object named school" or "education" 
(only the socially constructed ideas about what will count as school or 
education) and so no such thing as an educational criticism that concerns 
itself solely with narrowly defined issues of schooling and education. 
As insightful as Eagleton is about the critic's implication in political 
matters and about the political significance of the critic's work and as 
helpful as he therefore is in the effort to reconceptualize educational 
criticism, he ought not be appropriated wholesale, I argue in Chapter 4. 
For one thing, Eagleton remains bound by a political consciousness that, I 
believe, ultimately inhibits the power of his criticism. In these times of 
mass cynicism and despair, we need a language that evokes a 
consciousness wholly alternative to the world as it is ~ a world dominated 
by concerns with competition, hierarchy, and enemies, and so a world 
where struggles over gaining, maintaining, or resisting power require our 
almost constant attention. We need a critical language that, as the 
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theologian/social critic Walter Brueggemann (1978) puts it, both energizes 
and dismantles, a language that inspires us to create a new and better 
world as we recognize that the world we are living in is not at all the 
world we ought to have created. This the biblical prophets understood 
well: 
The proper idiom for the prophet in cutting through the royal 
numbness and denial is the language of grief, the rhetoric that 
engages the community in mourning for a funeral they do not 
want to admit. It is indeed their own funeral.... Grief and 
mourning, the crying in pathos, is the ultimate form of 
criticism, for it announces the sure end of the whole royal 
arrangement (Brueggemann, 1978, p. 51). 
For Brueggemann, the language of grief is a visionary language in the sense 
that it evokes an alternative consciousness, a consciousness in which the 
world as we know it not only should not continue but cannot continue. 
Secondly, Eagleton's model of criticism as political struggle presumes 
a consciousness of affiliation — with either social movements or institutions 
that support the intellectual work of criticism. However, both assumptions 
seem hard to justify in the American context where most people do not 
even vote, much less participate in political opposition, and where the idea 
of tenure and the academic freedom it supposedly brings is unthinkable 
outside the confines of colleges and universities. If being politically active 
and/or on a faculty is the precondition for writing criticism, this work is, 
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almost by definition, a specialty reserved for the few. I argue that we 
therefore need either to reconceptualize the work of criticism, using a 
metaphor other than that of political struggle, or (and this perhaps amounts 
to the same thing) to redefine what "the political" means. We need a model 
of educational/social criticism that speaks to people like June Jordan (1987), 
who writes of her struggle to see herself as a social critic at a time in her 
life when the whole idea of choosing one's work seemed preposterous: 
As a mother without a husband, as a poet without a publisher, 
a free-lance journalist without assignment, a city planner 
without a contract, it seemed to me that several incontestable 
and conflicting necessities had suddenly eliminated the whole 
realm of choice from my life.... What I could not see was how I 
should go forward, now, in any natural, coherent way (p. 20). 
Reading Jordan, I want to tell Eagleton that he is asking the wrong 
questions, or asking too few questions, or asking questions that are too 
constrained by notions of what political opposition is. At least as important 
as the question of how institutionalized critics can work more efficaciously 
(by avowing the politically strategic nature of their work, Eagleton would 
say) is the question of how noninstitutionalized discontents can speak and 
be heard. 
Thirdly, Eagleton's model of criticism, to my mind, overlooks the 
educational dimension of this work. Here, I think we need to follow the 
lead of Paulo Freire (1990) who writes so eloquently about the centrality of 
faith and hope to all educational work. There can be no real education, 
Freire argues, in the absence of a profound faith in people. Neither, I 
would argue, can there be any serious educational criticism without this 
faith. This is faith not that people will come to see the world as others see 
it, but rather faith in their capacity to cultivate their own critical 
consciousness — that is, to become critics themselves. And the special role 
of the educational critic is perhaps just this: to educate people about the 
value not of criticism in general but of their own critical consciousness in 
particular. 
Organizationally, this dissertation begins by situating the field of 
educational criticism in its historical context (Chapter 1). One of the effects 
of the reconceptualist movement of the 1960s and 1970s was the break-up of 
the field of curriculum. Out of the radical questioning of those years came 
a renewed awareness of the need to situate issues of education and 
schooling in their social and cultural contexts and to recognize the 
significance of their social constructedness. Although this insight clearly 
has shaped the practice of educational criticism, at a theoretical level the 
implications of recognizing educational criticism as a form of social and 
cultural criticism have not been worked out. 
To try to gain some insight into the theoretical dimension of a 
reconceptualized practice of educational criticism, I turn then in the second 
and third chapters to a critique of influential and important examples of 
educational criticism, critical texts that clearly do function as forms of social 
and cultural criticism: the National Commission on Excellence in 
Education's A Nation at Risk, Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American 
Mind. Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and Henry Giroux's 
Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life. On the basis of my own critique 
of these texts (aided and abetted by others') and reflection on that critique, I 
try then in Chapter 4 to clarify some of the problems, tensions, and 
unresolved questions inherent in the practice of educational criticism and to 
lay the groundwork for a model of educational criticism in which "faith in 
the people" is central and, to borrow an insight from Toni Morrison,2 the 
encounter between the work of criticism and the critic herself is taken into 
account. 
As David Purpel (1989) has argued with respect to scholarship in 
general, the important question is neither what scholars' specialties can do 
for the broader society nor what the broader society can do for those 
specialties. Rather, the important question is, given the social and cultural 
realities of today, what needs to be done? Similarly, I would argue that the 
question with respect to educational/social criticism is neither how best to 
construe the social function of this work (that is, legitimate it) nor how best 
to understand the constraints within which contemporary critics work (that 
is, rationalize their shortcomings). Rather, the important question is, given 
the social and cultural realities of today, what needs to be done? 
However, in the course of writing this essay I have come to see that 
this is only one side of the question — that the question of what needs to be 
done cannot fail to be shaped by another: Who am I who asks such a 
question? Or, who am I in relation to what needs to be done? After all, it 
finally is not logical inconsistencies, ill-conceived theory, dangerous 
discourses, or destructive rhetorics that infuriate us (and so prompt our 
critical texts), but people done wrong — people we care about (or don't) and 
people with whom we share a world. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE FIELD OF EDUCATIONAL CRITICISM 
Theory on a dramatic scale happens when it is both possible 
and necessary for it to do so.... Theory is just practice forced 
into a new form of self-reflectiveness.... Like small lumps on 
the neck, it is a symptom that all is not well. 
— Terry Eagleton 
Rarely has so much been written about the public schools and their 
function in the broader American society and culture as in the last two 
decades. The wave of alarm as the economy of the United States has 
faltered amidst a jockeying for position in the so-called New World Order 
has combined with theoretical ferment across the social sciences and the 
humanities to produce what is perhaps an unprecedented amount of critical 
comment on our public schools. Given the central role these schools play, 
for good or ill, in training the nation's workforce, it is no surprise that 
along with a stalled economy has come a heightened interest in and 
concern about how well the pubic schools are doing their "job" of 
producing human capital. Also, given the central role the schools play, for 
good or ill, in preserving and transmitting the dominant culture, it is no 
surprise that with the scrutinizing of the concepts of truth and rationality 
(amidst suspicion that concealed within are the workings of power and 
desire) has come renewed interest in and concern about how well the 
public schools are doing their "job" of transmitting a common culture. As 
the unemployment lines grow longer while the trade deficit grows, and as 
racial and ethnic hostilities increase while the nation becomes rapidly more 
multi-cultural, educational criticism takes on a heightened significance. 
Yet, and surprisingly, there seems to be little clarity or at least 
explicitness on the part of the critics themselves about what educational 
criticism is. Answers to questions about the task and tools of educational 
criticism — What should the educational critic be trying to do, and how go 
about it? ~ are, of course, always implicit in the practice itself. A great deal 
of educational criticism, for example, construes the public schools, to use 
Samuel Freedman's (1990) metaphor, "as a bathysphere, tethered to the ship 
of society but bobbing peacefully undersea, somehow unaffected by 
whatever mutinies or hurricanes wracked the vessel" (p. 5). Such a view of 
the relationship between schooling and society produces a reductionistic 
criticism, which defines "educational" problems in such a way as to suggest 
solutions that require little change in either the existing institutional 
framework or the broader society and culture. For example, when critics 
point to test scores (still too low) and dropout rates (still too high) as the 
problems, they then can propose such simple solutions as standardizing or 
stratifying the curriculum. Although standardization leads to "teaching to 
the test," this can indeed raise scores. Similarly, although stratification 
leads to institutionalizing some form of tracking, such a system can enable 
frustrated or completely alienated students to log in their time with a 
minimum of engagement ~ them with the school and the school with them. 
However, when solutions like these are offered to problems defined 
accordingly, serious and necessary social and cultural critique is 
circumvented. The task of educational criticism in this vein is reduced, 
consequently, to providing insight into the technicalities of fine-tuning 
existing school policies and practices. 
While such oversimplification and distortion of educational issues 
characterizes a great deal of contemporary educational criticism, a whole 
range of critical practice offers the public schools no such protection from 
the "mutinies" and "hurricanes" of the larger society and culture. As 
theoretical paradigms have been uprooted, disciplinary boundaries eroded, 
and the subjects they were supposed to contain exposed as social 
constructions, schooling and education also have seeped out from the 
classroom walls and opened themselves up to the critiques of such diverse 
critics as Allan Bloom and E. D. Hirsch Jr., William Bennett and Chester 
Finn Jr., Tracy Kidder and Samuel Freedman, and Henry Giroux and Paulo 
Freire. 
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As different as these critics are in their political orientations and in 
the form and style of their work (indeed, it seems odd to see their names in 
the same sentence), Bloom, Hirsch, Bennett, Finn, Kidder, Freedman, 
Giroux, and Freire nevertheless share, if nothing else, a critical perspective 
on the public schools as a social institution absolutely inseparable from its 
cultural context. They also share a conviction that these are times of grave 
social and cultural crisis. Although Bloom, Bennett, and Giroux, for 
example, offer quite different descriptions of our social ills (emphasizing 
cultural decay, the nation's economic problems, or continuing and 
pervasive social injustice, respectively), they seem to agree that this is no 
time for business as usual. In other words and in terms of the distinction 
Terry Eagleton makes between "criticism" and "critique," these critics agree 
that we need insight that in some sense points us beyond where we are and 
helps us respond to our very serious and very real social problems: 
"Criticism," in its Enlightenment sense, consists in recounting 
to someone what is awry with their situation, from an external, 
perhaps "transcendental" vantage-point. "Critique" is that form 
of discourse which seeks to inhabit the experience of the 
subject from the inside, in order to elicit those "valid" features 
of that experience which point beyond the subject's present 
condition (Eagleton, 1991, p. xiv). 
Although serious educational critics across the political spectrum 
agree that what is wrong with our schools reflects in some fashion or is 
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related in some way to what is wrong in the broader society and culture, 
the implications of this for the theory and practice of educational criticism 
have not been explored deeply enough. This, then, is my project: through 
critique of the theory and practice of educational criticism to help construct 
a conceptual framework for this work or at least to clarify some of the 
relevant questions. 
Educational criticism as a tradition surely can be traced back through 
the progressives and the work of John Dewey. My concern, however, is 
with the body of criticism that has grown out of the curriculum theory 
movement, perhaps best described by William Pinar (1975). In the preface 
to his anthology Curriculum Theorizing. Pinar divided the field of 
curriculum studies into three genres on the basis of the writers' focus and 
the function of the writing within the field itself: 1) traditionalist criticism, 
which (under Ralph Tyler's influence) focused narrowly on issues of 
practice in the interest of facilitating decision-making in the classroom; 2) 
conceptual empiricist criticism, which (under the influence of the behavioral 
and social scientists) investigated school phenomena in the interest of 
predicting and controlling behavior; and 3) reconceptualist criticism, which 
(under the influence of the humanities) explored the nature of the 
educational experience, including but not limited to school experience. 
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This third genre, an outgrowth of the reconceptualist movement, has 
given rise to a tremendous amount of broadly focused educational criticism. 
Such criticism, of course, also has come from outside the education 
profession. Scholars in other academic fields ~ sociologist Stanley 
Aronowitz, for example — as well as writers outside the academy — cultural 
critic Jonathan Kozol, for example — have made important contributions. 
Despite all this work, however, there has been little attempt to define the 
practice of educational criticism. Gail McCutcheon (1982) notes that 
although "most articles about educational criticism call for it... few articles 
have discussed epistemological and methodological issues" (p. 174). She 
goes on to describe educational criticism as a kind of research "that causes 
us to form links between theory and practice" and to call for a collaborative 
critical practice, shaped by rejection of the assumption that "we can 
understand practice merely by watching events, without discussing them 
with the actors" - a concept Patti Lather (1986) develops in her inquiry into 
the methodological requirements of an emancipatory approach to research 
in the human sciences (p. 174). More recently, Henry Giroux (1988a) has 
argued for an integration of "the central theoretical features of a 
postmodernism of resistance with the more radical elements of modernist 
discourse ... as part of a broader theory of schooling and pedagogy" (pp. 7, 
25). Giroux's primary concern, however, is with the language and 
conceptual categories of the discourse of educational criticism, not with 
issues of methodology and form. As far as defining the practice of 
educational criticism itself, the framework elaborated by John Steven Mann 
(1975) remains the model. Mann's essay on curriculum criticism lays the 
theoretical groundwork for the broader practice of educational criticism that 
has evolved out of the breakup of the curriculum field and the 
development of the reconceptualist movement. 
The practice of educational criticism has now in some sense outrun 
its theory, which therefore needs analysis and critique. Toward that end I 
want to review and critique Mann's work — to review his argument that the 
curriculum critic ought to look at curriculum as if it were a literary object 
and to critique this argument in light of developments ("upheavals" might 
be the better term) in the field of literary theory itself, which, to my 
knowledge, no one has explicated more cogently than Eagleton (1983). 
However, because I believe the difficulties and challenges of educational 
criticism reflect the difficulties and challenges of the broader practice of 
social and cultural criticism, I also want to consider the implications of 
some critiques of this broader critical practice - specifically, Russell 
Jacoby's (1987) and Barbara Ehrenreich's (1989). I turn then in the second 
and third chapters to what I see as the two most important strains of 
contemporary educational criticism and critique representative texts as a 
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way of trying to gain insight into some of the problems and difficulties of 
this work. 
In describing the practice of curriculum criticism Mann (1975) begins 
with the question of "what is involved in talking about curriculum as if it 
were a literary object" (p. 133). More specifically, he argues that curriculum 
ought to be seen as a "network of selections [that] constitutes an assertion 
of meaning — a symbolic commentary upon life" (p. 134). The curriculum 
critic's task, therefore, is to disclose that meaning by explaining the design 
of a curriculum in such a way as to illuminate the nature of the influence it 
exerts. This is a methodology of moral discernment in the sense that it is 
grounded in what Mann calls the critic's personal ethical knowledge. The 
critic's "commitment is to disclosing those meanings that impinge upon his 
ethical knowledge ... meanings about which he believes ethical judgments 
are to be made" (p. 145). This is a methodology also of moral responsibility 
in the sense that the critic is to regard herself as in some sense related to 
the subject of her critique: 
Curriculum ... is a form of influence over persons, and 
disclosures of meaning in a curriculum are disclosures about 
the character of an influence.... The curriculum critic ... must 
regard himself as responsible to that influence, and must 
consider that influence from the perspective of his 
responsibility (p. 145). 
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Mann (1975) makes an important contribution toward delineating a 
concept of educational criticism by insisting that because meaning comes 
with the territory of curriculum, curriculum criticism is a moral endeavor 
that entails responsibility. But there are some problems with his thought. 
To say that the curriculum critic's task is to disclose meanings about which 
she believes moral judgments should be made is to raise the question of 
whether the critic should include those judgments in the criticism itself. 
No, Mann concludes, but not without some equivocation: 
If the judgments are included, there is a danger that the critic's 
commitment to disclosing may become a commitment to 
persuading, and his criticism become advocacy.... 
The danger if the critic does not make ethical judgments 
of the meanings he has disclosed is that the judgments may 
never be made, or may be made improperly. Still, considering 
the extent to which curriculum literature is dominated by 
advocacy and the frequent failure of the most enlightened 
advocacy to bring about enlightened reform, this second 
danger seems small next to the first. My tentative conviction is 
that the critic would do well to write his critique in dimensions 
that to him are of ethical import, thereby giving tools to the 
practitioner, and allow the latter the freedom to employ the 
critique, or the many critiques, as he and his colleagues who 
design curricula see fit (pp. 145-46). 
Here, Mann draws a line between moral sensibility and political 
commitment. The critic is to proceed self-consciously from her own moral 
sensibilities, but not spell out their political implications. As Eagleton 
(1983) has argued, however, political commitment and moral sensibility 
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cannot be so easily separated. For, 
fGlenuine moral argument... sees the relations between 
individual qualities and values and our whole material 
conditions of existence. Political argument is not an alternative 
to moral preoccupations: it is those preoccupations taken 
seriously in their full implications (p. 208). 
Mann (1975) anticipated such criticism and offered his own self-
critique. In comments accompanying the anthologized version of his essay 
on curriculum criticism, he speaks of the "clear-cut choice" he came to face: 
"either abandon the notion that curriculum work can have progressive 
social significance, or unequivocally embrace the Marxist analysis, with all 
it entails about class struggle, and apply it to the work of curriculum" (p. 
132). In leaving the profession of education, Mann seems to have chosen 
the former course. However, in laying out the choice, he left behind a call 
to develop a curriculum criticism that takes seriously its own implication in 
political struggle ~ a challenge that invites critique of Mann's own more 
aesthetically oriented model. 
The heart of the problem, I believe, is the understanding of 
"curriculum" implicit in Mann's discussion of the how-to of criticism. 
Curriculum, for Mann, seems to be what most people think it is, a plan of 
study with its own integrity and boundaries ~ a plan of study rich in 
"meanings" with significant moral import, but a circumscribable plan of 
study nonetheless. Such a narrow notion of curriculum, however (and as 
we see in Mann's work), sets up a dialectic between the critic's "personal 
ethical knowledge" and the text that is the curriculum. A Marxist analysis, 
as Mann suggests, clearly would situate this dialectic in a broader social 
and explicitly political context and would critique the text from the 
perspective of its relevance to the particular social and political "struggles 
and wishes of the age" (Marx, 1975, quoted in Fraser, 1989, p. 113). To 
critique curriculum from this perspective is, of course, to practice what is 
clearly social and cultural criticism — albeit on the subject of curriculum. 
More than this, however, such an orientation cannot fail to call into 
question the whole concept of curriculum as a circumscribable text. As the 
political dimensions of this text also come under scrutiny, its social and 
historical constructedness becomes clear. The task then becomes not so 
much to relate the meanings a curriculum supposedly contains to its social 
and political context, but rather to clarify the meanings of "the struggles 
and wishes of the age" as reflected or refracted in the text, which is itself, as 
Giroux (and others) would say, "a terrain of struggle." Such a 
reconceptualization of criticism situates the critic in the political struggle -
and so broadens considerably the critic's own sphere of responsibility. 
As I said, no one, to my knowledge, has wrestled more diligently 
than Eagleton with questions of what such a critical practice (one that takes 
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seriously its own social and political implication) looks like. Eagleton's 
critique of literary theory, therefore, provides an important model for 
curriculum criticism. Eagleton (1983) deconstructs the notion of literature 
as a distinctive category of texts, then argues that literary theory, along 
with its purported subject, ought best be buried. In the process, he 
develops the theoretical foundation of a more responsible criticism ~ one 
that subjugates method as well as subject to practical, strategic, political 
concerns: 
It is not a matter of starting from certain theoretical or 
methodological problems: it is a matter of starting from what 
we want to do, and then seeing which methods and theories 
will best help us to achieve these ends. Deciding on your 
strategy will not pre-determine which methods and object of 
study are more valuable. As far as the object of study goes, 
what you decide to examine depends very much on the 
practical situation... what you are practically trying to do (pp. 
210-11). 
The practice of literary criticism, Eagleton argues, can be defined neither in 
terms of its putative subject matter — "an object named literature" — nor in 
terms of its methodology (p. 204). For the host of literary critical methods 
can be used to analyze any number of "texts": 
If you have nothing better to do at a party you can always try 
on a literary critical analysis of it, speak of its styles and 
genres, discriminate its significant nuances or formalize its 
sign-systems.... So either literary criticism confesses that it can 
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handle parties just as well as it can Shakespeare, in which case 
it is in danger of losing its identity along with its object; or it 
agrees that parties may be interestingly analysed provided that 
this is called something else: ethnomethodology or 
hermeneutical phenomenology, perhaps (p. 202). 
In the face of such methodological promiscuity, literary critics must 
contextualize their practice and, in a gesture of intellectual honesty, 
recognize its political grounding: 
[A]ny body of theory concerned with human meaning, value, 
language, feeling and experience will inevitably engage with 
broader, deeper beliefs about the nature of human individuals 
and societies, problems of power and sexuality, interpretations 
of past history, versions of the present and hopes for the 
future. It is not a matter of regretting that this is so.... Literary 
theories are not to be upbraided for being political, but for 
being on the whole covertly or unconsciously so... (Eagleton, 
1983, p. 195). 
A morally responsible critical practice, therefore, must respond to social and 
political realities. This is a model of critical engagement, a concept 
elaborated by Gramsci and echoed by Foucault (1977), who juxtaposes the 
universal intellectual ~ "the rhapsodist of the eternal... who bears the 
values of all" — with the strategic intellectual who puts her knowledge and 
power in the service of political struggle (p. 129). 
Educational criticism invites a critique similar to Eagleton's of literary 
theory. Just as there is no such thing as "an object named literature," 
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neither is there any such thing as "an object named education" or even "an 
object named curriculum" - a set of practices or texts that exist somehow 
apart from their social and cultural context. Consequently, then, there is no 
such thing as an educational criticism that would critique issues of practice, 
policy, and curriculum in the public schools without simultaneously 
critiquing the social and cultural context of those practices, policies, and 
texts. As Michael Apple (1987) has said, not only must "any cogent critique 
of the 'quality of life' within schools ... also be a critique of the quality of 
life outside of schools" (p. 91). Also and more broadly, 
[A]ny critical act in an educational sense is by necessity an act 
that is critical of the dominant normative structure of the larger 
society. Educational criticism, hence, becomes cultural, 
political, and economic criticism as well (p. 90). 
Just as the proliferation of literary theory in the last two or three 
decades can be seen as a response to the all-but-inevitable "crisis of the 
humanities" in late capitalist society, so too can the burst of educational 
criticism in the 1980s and 1990s be seen as a response to the all-but-
inevitable "crisis of the state" in late twentieth-century America. Eagleton 
(1989) asks rhetorically, "How could the humanities not be in crisis in social 
orders where it is perfectly clear, whatever their own protestations to the 
contrary, that the only supremely valuable activity is one of turning a fast 
buck?" (p. 29). Similarly, we might ask how the public schools could not be 
in crisis, given the reality of our labor market needs (a few technically 
proficient and knowledgeable professionals and a great mass of workers 
willing to work at low-wage, intellectually deadening jobs) and the 
persistence of ideals that have always been part of at least the discourse of 
educational reform — freedom, equality, and democracy. 
As a form of social and cultural criticism, educational criticism shares 
in all the difficulties and tensions that critics like Eagleton, Jacoby, and 
Ehrenreich have explored. Their criticisms of criticism (and critics), 
therefore, should tell us something about the challenges facing educational 
critics. Among the problems Jacoby, Ehrenreich, and Eagleton analyze are 
the academization of criticism and, related to this, issues of accountability ~ 
difficulties that raise (again) the old question of the social function of 
criticism. 
In a time when the gap widens not only between the haves and the 
have-nots but also between the well read and the poorly read, critics cannot 
avoid the question of who they are writing for and why. "The most 
important question we can ask ourselves as feminist critics," Lillian 
Robinson once said, "is 'So what?'" (quoted in Newton & Rosenfelt, 1985). 
Eagleton (1984) forces the same issue: 
31 
Imagin[e] the moment in which a critic, sitting down to begin a 
study of some theme or author, is suddenly arrested by a set of 
disturbing questions. "What is the point of such a study? 
Who is it intended to reach, influence, impress?" (p. 7). 
The absence of a viable public sphere throws into graphic and painful relief 
the growing chasm between the academy (the location of most critics, 
would-be critics, and potential critics) and the rest of the world. Jacoby and 
Ehrenreich, like Eagleton, speak to the question of how this situation came 
about. How is it, each asks in so many words, that we who would write 
social and cultural criticism have ended up essentially preaching to a 
relatively small choir? Although Nancy Fraser (1989) insists that the worlds 
of scholarship and of political struggle ultimately are not incompatible, she 
captures the tension well in describing herself as "someone who had once 
protested the war research of the 'New Mandarins' and tried to lure 
workers to study groups on Marxist political economy but who was now 
having to grade students and to publish or perish" (p. 3). Eagleton (1984), 
less focused on his own implication in the problems he describes, rails 
against a modern criticism that amounts, as he sees it, to little more than "a 
handful of individuals reviewing each other's books" (p. 107). 
Jacoby (1987) traces the near-disappearance of more public-issue-
oriented intellectuals and argues that would-be social critics have retreated 
into the professional havens of universities where they have concerned 
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themselves far less with public issues than with institutionalized 
specializations. This fleeing of the public sphere can be explained in social 
and economic terms. Corporate employees increasingly have replaced 
entrepreneurs, and higher education itself has become big business. 
These currents carried intellectuals from independence to 
dependence, from free-lance writing to salaried teaching in 
colleges. Between 1920 and 1970 the United States population 
doubled, but the number of college teachers multiplied ten­
fold, rising from 50,000 in 1920 to 500,000 in 1970 (p. 14). 
However, Jacoby emphasizes not this structural dimension of the near-
disappearance of public intellectuals, but rather what he suggests is a moral 
failing: "Younger intellectuals have responded to their times, as they must; 
they have also surrendered to them, as they need not" (p. 237). Seeking the 
security and prestige of university positions, too many intellectuals have 
forsaken the broader public to advance their own careers, Jacoby suggests, 
and this has jeopardized "the vitality of a public culture" itself (p. 4). 
Without public intellectuals to produce it, a public discourse of social 
critique disappears. 
It is important to ask, however, what counts as public in Jacoby's 
argument. Or, to put it another way, how public is or was the discourse 
now conspicuously absent? Jacoby acknowledges that the kind of broad, 
general argument he makes cannot be backed with hard data. The 
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discourse he is talking about, however, seems to be that which might be 
written by younger, public-issue-oriented intellectuals publishing in such 
periodicals as The New York Review of Books. Commentary. Harper's. 
Atlantic, and The New Yorker — all well-respected publications with large 
circulations but not periodicals most people read. If the vitality of public 
culture is at stake, whose culture we are talking about matters. 
Ehrenreich (1989) offers a vantage point from which to see this. In 
one sense, she makes the same argument in Fear of Falline that Jacoby 
makes in The Last Intellectuals. Ehrenreich traces a "retreat from 
liberalism" on the part of the professional middle class, which, she says, has 
adopted "a meaner, more selfish outlook" over the last three decades, and, 
like Jacoby, suggests that intellectuals seem not to care about others 
(particularly relatively powerless others) as much as they once did (p. 3). 
For Ehrenreich, however, this is primarily an issue of class consciousness: 
In our culture, the professional, and largely white, middle class 
is taken as a social norm — a bland and neutral mainstream — 
from which every other group or class is ultimately a kind of 
deviation.... Nameless, and camouflaged by a culture in which 
it both stars and writes the scripts, this class plays an 
overweening role in defining "America": its moods, political 
direction, and moral tone (pp. 3, 6). 
The retreat from liberalism, Ehrenreich suggests, is the political dimension 
of a shift in consciousness, a growing awareness on the part of this "script-
writing" class that it constitutes not the norm but a not particularly well-
liked elite. The "discoveries" of the poor in the beginning of the 1960s and 
of the working class towards the end of that decade (by professionals) 
along with the student rebellion of the 1960s "combined to convince an 
influential minority of the professional middle class that their class was, in 
fact, a very special group, an elite above the majority" (p. 10). 
What Ehrenreich (1989) means by "the professional middle class" is 
"all those people whose economic and social status is based on education, 
rather than on the ownership of capital or property" (p. 12). This sector of 
the population ~ at most 20 percent, Ehrenreich estimates — constitutes the 
potential audience of public intellectuals, it seems. The actual audience, of 
course, would be smaller. My point is simply that what for Jacoby seems 
to count as public is in fact probably only a small sector of the population. 
In light of Ehrenreich's argument that serious thought about public 
discourse requires awareness of how class stratification and the 
consciousness thereof impinge upon critiques and analyses, I would qualify 
Jacoby's argument: Potential critics or public intellectuals have forsaken the 
professional middle class, leaving this class with a very conflicted and 
confused class consciousness. 
From this perspective, the academization of criticism has to do not or 
not only with issues of focus ~ that is, with which issues attract critical 
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comment and which do not. Also important is the process by which some 
issues come to be seen as worthy of critical attention and others don't — 
which, of course, is inseparable from the process by which some people 
come to see themselves as social and cultural critics and others do not. I 
want simply to affirm what Ehrenreich suggests: that in a class-stratified 
society like ours what counts as the public interest is no longer, if it ever 
was, a function of public definition. As Eagleton suggests, criticism not 
written to speak to a public audience is only part of the problem. Also 
important is the absence of a way of engaging the public in social and 
cultural critique — which, for Eagleton (1984), means political struggle 
towards a socialist transformation of society: 
Genuine political popularization involves more than producing 
works which make socialist theory intelligible to a mass 
audience, important though that project is; such a readership 
must be institutionalized rather than amorphous, able to 
receive and interpret such work in a collective context and to 
ponder its consequences for political action (p. 113). 
In the void where such institutionalized critique should be serious 
questions of accountability arise. To whom or what is the social critic 
accountable and in what sense? Does Jim Merod (1987) overstate the case 
or are his sharp remarks much to the point? 
36 
What authorizes the critic's work? What relation does critical 
writing have to the academy as a whole and to the society of 
which it is a part?... [HJabits of interpretive judgment remain 
safely unaccountable to everything except an extremely small 
realm, the self-contained area called Theory, a world that 
seems to have no political impact beyond its own professional 
realignments, little if any moral responsibility ... and an almost 
thoroughly unexamined institutional context (pp. 4-5). 
Although neither Jacoby nor Ehrenreich speaks directly to this 
question of accountability, their critiques of the professional middle class in 
general and of intellectuals in particular suggest a perspective. Jacoby 
(1987) argues that "academic careers [have] undermined academic 
freedom" — a paradox that "recalls an inner contradiction of academic 
freedom ~ the institution neutralizes the freedom it guarantees" (p. 188-89). 
Consequently, "for many professors ... academic freedom [has] meant 
nothing more than the freedom to be academic" (p. 189). 
Ehrenreich's (1989) discussion of the ethos of professionalism 
suggests that the "freedom to be academic" is also the freedom to enjoy 
one's work. The real plum of professional work, she says, is pleasure: 
Professions, as opposed to jobs, are understood to offer some 
measure of intrinsic satisfaction, some linkage of science and 
service, intellect and conscience, autonomy and responsibility. 
No one has such expectations of a mere job: and it is this, as 
much as anything, which defines the middle-class advantage 
over the working-class majority (p. 261). 
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However, power as well as pleasure distinguishes these intrinsically 
rewarding professional jobs from other, more boring and tedious ones: 
Relative to the working class, the holders of middle-class 
occupations are in positions of command or, at the very least, 
authority. Their job is to conceptualize, in broad terms, what 
others must do. The job of the worker, blue or pink collar, is 
to get it done. The fact that this is a relationship of domination 
~ and grudging submission ~ is usually invisible to the middle 
class but painfully apparent to the working class (pp. 132-33). 
Besides an inequality of power, then, there is an inequality in terms of 
moral agency, perhaps even more insidious, in the relationship between the 
professional-middle and the working classes. Professionals are busy. Their 
time is valued in a way that mere workers' time is not, and this in itself is 
"an essential insignia of status ~ and a not entirely ineffective one": 
To have time and attention for others is to concede their 
importance. The upwardly mobile professional, rushing from 
one appointment or deadline to another, concedes nothing to 
those who are less harried and hence, obviously, less important 
(p. 232). 
In this sense, the right to be too busy for others is only another way of 
talking about the power to demean. 
This, as I see it, is the crux of "the freedom to be academic" — the 
freedom to respond (or not) to something other than, something more 
important than, others' immediate needs and wants. Clearly, some things 
are more important than others' needs and wants, but this only complicates 
the moral question: What things are more important than whose immediate 
needs and wants, and who ought to decide this? Ehrenreich avoids this 
moral question by, on the one hand, calling for intrinsically rewarding work 
for everybody and, on the other, all but condemning the ethos of 
professionalism - the ethos, that is, of the one realm of work that does offer 
some measure of intrinsic reward. The real plum of professional work, it 
seems, is the right (freedom) to make moral decisions and judgments. 
While doctors are expected to decide, if a choice must be made, whose life 
is most worth saving, and scholars are expected to decide, since they can't 
study everything, what issues are most worth studying, secretaries are not 
expected to decide what assigned work is worth doing. My question is not 
whether everyone should have this moral autonomy (it seems clear enough 
to me that they should), but rather the relationship between this moral 
autonomy and prevailing relations of power. 
The social-class structure Ehrenreich lays out — the truly rich on top, 
followed by the professional middle class, the working class, and the poor-
leaves the professional middle class out of the loop in an important sense. 
The overall political project, Ehrenreich (1989) says, is the creation of a 
classless society: "Tax the rich and enrich the poor until both groups are 
absorbed into some broad and truly universal middle class. The details are 
subject to debate" (p. 256). The role of the professional middle class in this 
redistribution of wealth and so of power, it seems, is to direct the 
downward flow. In this closed-system model of power and wealth, the 
professional middle class is asked to be more caring and less self-oriented, 
but not necessarily to relinquish any of its own power and wealth. It is 
perhaps not too much of an oversimplification to say that in this 
construction of social relationships the responsibility of the professional 
middle class is either 1) to persuade those with a great deal of power and 
wealth to give up some of it so that those with very little can have more or 
2) to counsel the poor and the disenfranchised about how to get what they 
need and deserve. 
This argument, of course, rests on a particular understanding of 
power and a related ethic of deserving bound up with a notion of moral 
autonomy. Just as some people supposedly deserve power and wealth and 
others do not; some supposedly deserve or can be trusted with moral 
autonomy and others don't or can't. This argument falls apart, however, if 
"power" is understood as something other than the ability and socially-
sanctioned right to impose one's will on others. If the point is essentially a 
redistribution of power, the professional middle class can hold on to what it 
has and direct the downward flow out and around itself. However, if the 
goal is not reformation but rather transformation ~ where the point is a 
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reconceptualization as well as a redistribution of power ~ the professional 
middle class is implicated and its moral autonomy called into question. 
This tension between the need to redistribute power and the need to 
rethink it altogether pervades the feminist struggle, and it is in feminist 
theorizing that I find the most insightfulness about what this tension means 
for related issues of moral autonomy and accountability. Consider, for 
example, Ehrenreich's (1989) argument that although enabling a few women 
to attain the economic power of their privileged male counterparts is finally 
not the point of the feminist struggle, neither are issues of economic power 
unimportant: 
Surely the aim of the struggle was not to propel a few women 
to the top of a fundamentally unjust hierarchy, in which most 
women counted for little more than cheap labor. Yet as many 
quite racial feminists came to realize, there is no way that an 
economically marginalized group can be expected to "wait for 
the revolution," letting moral purity compensate for certain 
poverty (p. 216). 
Bell hooks (1984) is far less conciliatory — or, depending on your 
perspective, far less realistic. "Women cannot gain much power on the 
terms set by the existing social structure without undermining the struggle 
to end sexist oppression," she says. For one gains money and power by 
and only by "embracing, supporting, and perpetuating the dominant 
ideology of the culture" (pp. 84-85). Hooks sets against a notion of power 
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as domination and control a notion of power as the creative and life-
affirming ability to act. Many feminist theologians offer similar 
juxtapositions. Carter Heyward (1982), for example, sets side-by-side 
dunamis and exousia: 
"Authority" (exousia) is power that has been granted, power 
that is socially-licensed or allowed.... Occasionally, a person 
manifests a different kind of authority. Not having been 
granted exousia within the social order, she nonetheless 
manifests power ~ dunamis: a power unmediated by official 
social legitimation. Dunamis is experienced by others as raw 
power, spontaneous, uncontrollable, and often fearful (p. 41). 
Rita Nakashima Brock (1988) distinguishes power as dominance and erotic 
power: 
Our conventional understandings of power are colored by our 
experiences of life in societies of male dominance. From those 
experiences we come to believe that power is hierarchical and 
is demonstrated by dominance, by status, by authority, and by 
control over people, nature, and things. This may be the 
power we know, but it is not the power we were born with. 
The fundamental power of life, born into us, heals, makes 
whole, empowers, and liberates (p. 25). 
Dorothee Soelle (1984) simply repudiates "male power," which, for her, "has 
something to do with roaring, shouting, and giving orders," and warns that 
identifying with any of this is "the worst thing that can happen to a 
woman" (p. 112). 
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If these women are right in suggesting that "power" needs to be 
rethought and not just redistributed, then the ethos of professionalism and 
the moral autonomy it promises must be called into question. If all power 
is relational, as Heyward and Brock argue, "moral autonomy" is a 
contradiction in terms. A relational notion of power implies moral 
accountability, not autonomy. In Jacoby's language, relational power 
implies not the freedom to be academic but the responsibility to be related. 
Cornel West develops this notion of relational responsibility. West 
would seem to be just what Jacoby has in mind ~ here is a brilliant man 
who sees no contradiction between the life of the mind and a public 
orientation. Indeed, the New York Times Magazine called West 
"Princeton's public intellectual" (Boynton, 1991, p. 39). West (1991) calls 
himself "more a cultural critic with philosophic training who works out of 
the Christian tradition than a theologian who focuses on the systematic 
coherency or epistemic validity of Christian claims" (p. xxix). And West 
(1989) clearly sees himself as an "organic intellectual" — someone who 
"revel[s] in ideas and relate[s] ideas to action by means of creating, 
constituting, or consolidating constituencies for moral aims and political 
purposes" (p. 6). He explains: 
An organic intellectual, in contrast to traditional intellectuals 
who often remain comfortably nested in the academy, attempts 
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to be entrenched in and affiliated with organizations, 
associations, and possibly, movements of grass-roots folk. Of 
course, he or she need be neither religious nor linked to 
religious institutions. Trade unions, community groups, and 
political formations also suffice (p. 234). 
In stressing that organic intellectuals must be not only public-oriented but 
public-situated — at the meetings — West suggests a process by which the 
common culture Raymond Williams envisions — one that arises out of 
broad participation in the creation of meanings and values ~ might be 
formed. In so doing West perhaps bridges the gap between those who 
would upgrade the culture of the professional middle class and those who 
would enlist this class in the effort to enrich a truly public culture. 
I say "perhaps" because I recall so clearly student responses to West's 
Prophesy Deliverance!: 
"This is no tract for the masses!" 
"Who is West writing for anyway?" 
"Along with whatever else he's doing, isn't he also 
letting others know how much fun it is to be a professor?" 
I think these criticisms are much too harsh, but they do provide a needed 
focus on the issue of language. Among the barriers to a common culture 
sustained by a truly public discourse and criticism is the lack of a common 
language or, more specifically, the skewed distribution of language. Huge 
disparities of institutionalized education in this society go hand-in-hand 
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with those of wealth and power. Hooks (1984) is quite right to point out 
that 
Time and money have been expended creating resources for 
women scholars and academics to pursue and promote their 
work. While this effort is important, it should not have greater 
priority than the struggle to ensure that all women read and 
write (p. 109). 
While the effort to raise the consciousness of the professional middle 
class and the effort to enrich public culture may not be incompatible, these 
struggles are not identical and ought not be confused. Similarly, and 
related to this, responding to issues and concerns identified with the public 
interest is not the same thing as being accountable to real people. When 
these distinctions are blurred, the particular power of the professional 
middle class, a power bound up with particular ways of thinking about 
responsibility and accountability, goes unscrutinized. The notion of 
accountability implicit in arguments like Jacoby's is class-based: It is would-
be public intellectuals from the same professional middle class who judge 
and evaluate the work of their more widely published peers. Responding 
to public issues and concerns is, of course, much better than ignoring them, 
but until the process by which public issues are defined is broadened, those 
who frame the so-called public discourse are essentially talking among 
themselves in a class-bound, educationally stratified group. 
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Unlike Jacoby and Ehrenreich, Eagleton (1984) emphasizes not the 
failings of conscience and consciousness that contribute to such insularity 
but rather the constraints of social and political forces. In the absence of a 
viable public sphere, efficacious criticism is all but impossible, he argues. 
In such a context, critics must choose between social relevance and 
intellectual integrity. 
With the modern "stratification" of society and socialization of 
the state, with the transgression of traditional boundaries 
between private and public, the space of the classical public 
sphere rapidly dwindles. 
Criticism, then, has the unwelcome choice of preserving 
a political content, thus gaining in social relevance what it 
loses in a partiality disruptive of the veiy public sphere it 
seeks to construct; or of assuming a transcendental standpoint 
beyond that sphere, thus safeguarding its integrity at the price 
of social marginality and intellectual nullity (pp. 64-65). 
Given such a dilemma - Should we say what we think at the risk of 
alienating those we would persuade, and who is listening anyway? -
Eagleton urges critics to situate their work against the political forces that 
have created such an untenable choice: "Modern criticism was born of a 
struggle against the absolutist state; unless its future is now defined as a 
struggle against the bourgeois state, it might have no future at all" (p. 124). 
Eagleton also, however, counsels humility. The political forces of late 
industrial capitalism put serious limits on criticism as an instrument of 
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social change: 
Socialist criticism cannot conjure a counterpublic sphere into 
existence; on the contrary, that criticism cannot itself fully exist 
until such a sphere has been fashioned. Until that time, the 
socialist critic will remain stranded between sage and man of 
letters, combining the critical dissociation of the former with 
the practical, engaged, wide-ranging activity of the latter (p. 
114). 
In the absence of a viable public sphere, social criticism remains insular — a 
weak force for social and cultural change that tends to be inadequately 
responsive (in the sense of accountable) to the broader public. 
In this bleak context, let me return to Mann's model of curriculum 
criticism ~ a practice that proceeds through moral discernment grounded in 
the critic's personal ethical knowledge. Jacoby's, Ehrenreich's, and 
Eagleton's critiques of social and cultural criticism suggest several problems 
with Mann's model of criticism. First, in light of Jacoby's critique of public 
intellectuals (in their absence) and the class bias that reading Jacoby against 
Ehrenreich suggests, I would argue that the critic's own moral sensibility 
and ethical knowledge need to be subjected to critique and the critic's own 
biases thereby factored into the work of criticism — a topic I will say more 
about in Chapter 4. 
Secondly, in light of the critique Mann himself invites, I would argue 
that educational criticism ought to proceed dialectically with a focus not on 
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the text as text but on the text as reflection/refraction of its broader context. 
Educational critics need to be clear not only, as Eagleton (1983) suggests, 
about what they are trying to do but also about what needs to be done - a 
question that social and political realities cannot "answer" but surely can 
frame. Without such a dialectical focus, critics remain accountable 
ultimately only to those whose social situation mirrors their own — which 
leads, of course, to the insularity in which the "So what?" question arises. 
Without a broader sphere of accountability as well as focus, critics are left 
with no way finally to justify their practice. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PRACTICE OF EDUCATIONAL CRITICISM I: 
A NATION AT RISK AND THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 
Although educational criticism remains a poorly defined, embryonic 
and amorphous field, a substantial body of educational discourse exists that 
is at once serious and thoughtful in nature, critical in orientation, and 
political in function. Full review of this literature is beyond the scope of 
this essay. However, critique of some of the most influential and 
representative texts will, I hope, both illuminate the various kinds of 
educational criticism being written today and show up some of its problems 
and limitations. 
For purposes of critique, I divide the field of serious contemporary 
educational criticism into two broad categories on the basis of general 
focus: 1) the economically- and geopolitically-oriented criticism exemplified 
in the national reform reports and, related to this literature, the more 
culturally-focused work of critics like E. D. Hirsch and Allan Bloom; and 
2) the morally-oriented and explicitly political literature of critical 
pedagogy. Perhaps the best example of the economically- and 
geopolitically-focused educational criticism is the Reagan Administration's 
National Commission on Excellence in Education's 1983 report, A Nation at 
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Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform, which was followed by a 
whole string of national reform reports.3 A Nation at Risk, however, is the 
best known and arguably the most influential. Reports like A Nation at 
Risk have made the front pages of major newspapers, have been widely 
critiqued and commented on, and largely have set the terms of the most 
recent wave of educational reform in drawing a relationship (sometimes 
direct and sometimes indirect) between matters of schooling, primarily 
curriculum and school governance, and what are put forth as the nation's 
economic and political interests. 
Closely related to this economically- and geopolitically-focused 
criticism is the politically compatible but more culturally-focused work 
perhaps best represented by Bloom's 1987 bestseller, The Closing of the 
American Mind — a critique, in part, of the kind of economism that shapes 
reports like A Nation at Risk and a call for a return to the basics not of 
performance and productivity but of philosophical foundationalism. This 
criticism represents a shift in the public discourse of reform as Western 
culture (and its supposedly jeopardized status) rather than the nation's 
geopolitical and economic agenda becomes the focus of critique: 
Since the second term of the Reagan administration, the debate 
on education has taken a new turn. Now, as before, the tone is 
principally set by the right, but its position has been radically 
altered. The importance of linking educational reform to the 
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needs of big business has continued to influence the debate, 
while demands that schools provide the skills necessary for 
domestic production and expanding capital abroad have 
slowly given way to an overriding emphasis on schools as sites 
of cultural production (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 24). 
Although Bloom's book presupposes what in Hirsch's terms would be a 
fairly high degree of cultural literacy, it has been widely read (assuming 
such a conclusion can be drawn from the book's bestseller-list status). 
Despite the book's shortcomings, which I will speak to, it provides a well 
contextualized and historically grounded diagnosis of our undeniable social 
crisis — complete with prescription: a back-to-basics, classics-centered, 
unapologetically elitist university curriculum. 
Because the cultural literacy criticism is so politically compatible with 
the more economically focused reform reports, I see this body of criticism 
as a whole. And in the public discourse, I would argue, this is it. There is 
no compelling alternative to this form of educational criticism. In the 
professional discourse, however, the morally-oriented and explicitly 
political literature of critical pedagogy, a body of writing that has evolved 
out of the work and writing of the Brazilian philosopher of education Paulo 
Freire, offers a thorough critique and functions as an important alternative 
voice. As a form of contemporary educational criticism, critical pedagogy is 
distinguished by its bold and continuous affirmation of the centrality of 
issues of justice and human emancipation to all facets of education, 
including educational criticism. Critics like Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) 
and Michael Apple (1990) have critiqued both the economism of reports like 
A Nation at Risk and the anti-egalitarianism of critics like Bloom. The 
critical pedagogy literature — in my opinion the most important and useful 
form of contemporary educational criticism — suffers, however, from its 
insularity. Written by and largely for a narrow spectrum of very well 
educated radical scholars, this literature lacks a significant public audience 
~ a situation that gives a muted ring to the ideals of genuine democracy 
that are so central to it. 
In this chapter I will develop critiques of A Nation at Risk and 
Closing of the American Mind as a way, first of all, of affirming the 
importance of these influential texts. Both have been integrated into the 
professional as well as public discourse and, as I said, have helped set the 
terms of the contemporary debate on educational reform. Secondly, I focus 
on A Nation at Risk and Bloom's book because, especially when viewed 
together, they raise important questions about the practice of educational 
criticism. (I turn then in Chapter 3 to a critique of books written by Freire 
and Giroux.) 
The most recent educational reform movement started with the 
publication of A Nation at Risk, a report that "prefigures, in uncanny 
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fashion, the host of issues that in time came to dominate our national 
dialogue on education reform" (Futrell, 1990, p. 259). The report's famous 
(many would say infamous) first paragraph draws a direct relationship 
between America's technological and economic strength and the nation's 
schools. First, there is the warning: "Our once unchallenged preeminence 
in commerce, industry, science, and technological innovation is being 
overtaken by competitors throughout the world" (p. 5). Then, significant 
relationships are suggested and the threat contextualized: "What our 
schools and colleges historically have accomplished" is connected (as a 
cause and/or dimension of the problem) with these issues of global 
competition and, in turn, with "American prosperity, security, and civility" 
(p. 5). In short, the report construes the well-being of Americans as 
contingent upon the outcome of a cut-throat international competition — a 
contest in which issues of curriculum and pedagogy are implicated. These 
relationships between, on one hand, the prosperity and security of 
Americans and the economic and technological competitiveness of America 
and, on the other, that competitiveness and the structure of schools are 
affirmed throughout the report. 
Important here is not only the way the language of economic and 
technological competitiveness reduces and trivializes educational possibility, 
but also the way the language of war militarizes the relationship drawn 
between educational possibility and the broader society. Our "mediocre 
educational performance," A Nation at Risk warns, amounts to an act of 
unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament" — one that, if imposed 
from without, would be akin to "an act of war" (p. 5). In other words, 
recognizable, identifiable enemies without — economically strong 
competitors who happily would do us in — are aided by insidious, more 
amorphous enemies within — "a rising tide of mediocrity" related to a 
"shoddiness" that afflicts "many walks of American life," including the 
schools (pp. 5,11). In this sense, the report represents a call to arms ~ an 
announcement that America is in trouble and that the schools essentially 
have been drafted into a multi-faceted war. 
Therefore, while A Nation at Risk on one level focuses on the 
viability of the United States economy in world markets, in a broader sense 
it speaks out of and for a particular consciousness ~ a consciousness of war 
in which competition is not only taken for granted but touted as the 
weapon of choice. This consciousness implies a worldview that explains 
the nation's economic problems (able competitors have capitalized on our 
sloth) and provides direction for our schools: Students need to learn not 
only particular technical skills but also an intensified spirit of competition, 
heightened by a fear of losing a very important battle. Given the state of 
the world, the state of the public schools, and the relationship between the 
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two, the report argues in so many words, educational institutions need to 
up the ante. High schools need to strengthen graduation requirements, 
colleges and universities need to raise admission requirements, students 
need to spend more time in school altogether, and those who want to teach 
need to compete more seriously both to enter and to remain in the 
profession. And for those who cannot or do not do these things, there is an 
ominous warning: 
The people of the United States need to know that individuals 
in our society who do not possess the levels of skill, literacy, 
and training essential to this new era will be effectively 
disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that 
accompany competent performance, but also from the chance 
to participate fully in our national life (p. 7). 
This, I suggest, amounts to a announcement that the effective 
grounds of citizenship are shifting or have shifted. This is a warning that 
those who cannot or do not contribute to the "war effort" to strengthen the 
economic power of the United States will be politically as well as 
economically disenfranchised. Exactly what disenfranchisement means in 
the context of A Nation at Risk is not made clear. What the report 
suggests, however, is that the schools not only should teach particular 
skills, provide certain kinds of training, and certify who does (and does not) 
acquire these things, but also and in the process should or could function as 
a mechanism for constituting and reshaping political society. In the context 
of an announcement that measurable knowledge and political rights will or 
should be more closely aligned than ever, the report's recommendations — 
tougher high school graduation and college admission requirements and 
less tolerance of teachers unable or unwilling to produce the necessary 
amount of what the report calls "intellectual capital" ~ amount to a plan for 
redrawing the effective lines of citizenship: Those who don't measure up 
can expect to enjoy neither the material rewards of success nor any 
significant degree of participation in the broader polity. To paraphrase the 
sentence quoted above: Those who for whatever reason fail to contribute 
adequately to the new economic order must realize they will become 
essentially second-class citizens. In sum, A Nation at Risk advances, 
through a rhetoric of nationalism and militarism, an argument for 
educational reform that evokes and speaks to fears that the nation's 
economic preeminence is in jeopardy. The call is for higher (and 
measurable) standards of achievement and more standardization of the 
curriculum, capped by a veiled threat of political disenfranchisement for 
those who don't measure up. 
A moral critique of A Nation at Risk clearly is implicit in my 
description of its content ~ a critique I want to explicate for two reasons. 
First, because the report has been widely read and discussed, and largely 
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welcomed (at least in the public discourse) as an important contribution to 
educational reform, the moral issues it raises warrant scrutiny in their own 
right. Secondly, I want to use my own critique to explore some of the 
questions that educational criticism raises when it functions as social 
criticism. 
A politics of disenfranchisement, which, I have said, A Nation at Risk 
condones or even advocates, flies squarely in the face of all democratic 
notions of egalitarianism, of the dignity and worth of all people, and of our 
shared responsibility for decision making and governance. Only in a 
context of widespread fear (of poverty, of powerlessness, of losing 
something important) and the presumption of scarcity (of jobs, of 
opportunities, of material well-being) could such a politics have any 
credence, it seems. As Sheila Slaughter (1985) puts it, 
To preserve a satisfying standard of living for the future,... the 
U.S. citizenry is asked [in A Nation at Risk! to sacrifice for the 
system, giving up chimeras of social conscience, such as full 
employment, educational equity, affirmation action. What 
makes the emotional logic the least bit convincing is fear: fear 
that too much has already been given to others (pp. 112-13). 
Or fear, I would add, that scarcity is real — that there no longer is enough 
to go around so that jobs and good educations for everybody are not 
possible -- and fear that beneath the veneer of nominal social civility lies 
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nothing more than a brutal war of all against all. 
In speaking to these fears in a nationalistic, militaristic language that 
covers with a moral aura an international competition for wealth and 
power, the report evokes a particular way of thinking about scarcity and 
the ethics of resource allocation. A Nation at Risk reflects what I see as the 
logic of triage — a metaphor the historian and theologian Richard 
Rubenstein (1983) uses to explain some of the horrors of human cruelty in 
modern times and a metaphor increasingly prevalent in the public 
discourse. I want to review Rubenstein's argument as well as instances of 
"triage" in the public discourse to try to clarify what I see as the critical 
moral dimensions of A Nation at Risk and to underscore the political 
significance of this way of thinking about scarcity. 
Rubenstein (1983) traces a pattern in post-Enlightenment times of 
mass destruction of people legally defined by governments as "surplus 
populations" — a term that refers to groups of people who for one reason or 
another come to have no viable role in their society and who consequently 
are regarded as disruptive forces that need to be controlled or removed 
from mainstream society altogether. A variety of control mechanisms have 
been used in such situations. Rubenstein explains: 
The least radical have involved revocation of the target 
population's customary rights of land tenure, as has occurred 
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whenever peasants have been evicted in order to facilitate the 
shift from subsistence farming to the raising of a cash crop for 
the market. More radical programs have involved the 
segregation or incarceration of target populations. These have 
taken the form of the compulsory settlement in reservations, 
ghettos, almshouses, and concentration or slave-labor camps. 
Even more radical measures have involved expulsion from 
one's homeland.... The most radical form of population 
elimination is, of course, outright extermination (p. 8). 
Viewed as a "solution" to the problem of surplus people, the Holocaust 
stands as simply the most extreme instance of a whole range of social-
control policies, which Rubenstein describes as forms of social triage. The 
etymology of the word is important: 
[T]he word triage is of French origin and comes from "trier," to 
pick or to cull. It denotes "the action of assorting according to 
quality." In the eighteenth century it was used to denote the 
sorting of fleece pelts. It was also used in connection with the 
sorting and sifting of coffee beans. In the twentieth century 
triage has been given both a political and a medical meaning. 
The word has been used to refer to the sorting of whole classes 
of human beings "according to quality" (Rubenstein, 1983, p. 
195). 
Although "triage" has acquired a broader significance in the twentieth 
century, the word most commonly refers to "the screening and classification 
of wounded, sick, or injured patients during war or another disaster to 
determine priority needs and thereby ensure the most efficient use of 
medical and surgical manpower, equipment, and facilities" (Webster's II). 
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Rubenstein (1983), however, as I said, uses triage as a metaphor to 
explain the phenomena of surplus populations — the products of a morally 
bankrupt economic rationality that holds nothing, including human life, 
sacred. Rather, in such a consciousness, human life "is simply another 
component to be calculated in amoral cost-benefit analyses" (p. 212). As 
almost daily, it seems, more layoffs, job cuts, and pending corporate 
"restructurings" are announced in this country, Rubenstein's 1983 warnings 
about America take on an eerie prescience: 
[I]f unemployment continues to increase, crisis-ridden 
government leaders may eventually feel compelled to 
reconsider the ways in which the problem is to be managed.... 
[I]n a period of acute economic hardship a future 
administration might conclude that mass unemployment and 
destitution no longer serve the national interest. If such a time 
ever comes, the problem of surplus people will admit of only 
two possible solutions: redistribution of resources and work 
opportunities or elimination of surplus people (pp. 207-08). 
At the very least, Rubenstein says, "one must ask whether the bonds of 
community between Americans would be sufficiently strong to protect the 
poor in a crisis" (p. 213). 
As a way of thinking about scarcity, triage puts at great risk the poor, 
the powerless, and anyone else who comes to be seen as an economic drain. 
A Nation at Risk reflects this logic in the sense that its call for higher 
standards and intensified competition, couched in a language of national 
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interest and military urgency, invites the sorting and selecting Ann Bastian 
et al. (1986) describe so well: 
By focusing on an economic bottom line, by narrowing their 
concern to accountability and basics, by ignoring the realities 
of inequity, the prevailing school critics do warn us of a grave 
social risk. But the risk they signal is that new standards of 
merit will become in practice new mechanisms of stratification 
and, ultimately, another means for pushing unwanted students 
out of the system (p. 22). 
However, while triage helps explain the economic rationality implicit in A 
Nation at Risk, what seems most important are the limitations of the 
metaphor. Pulled out of the context of life-and-death decision-making on 
the battlefield, the logic of triage leads to "the adoption of a harsh, 
unfeeling, permanent posture toward the problems of population growth 
and resource scarcity" (Rubenstein, 1983, p. 197). 
When used as a broadly descriptive metaphor, the language of triage 
also paints with a moral aura the crudeness of cost-benefit or ends-means 
thinking. Consider, for example, how the language of triage is being used 
in the public discourse. This language often surfaces, of course, in health­
care and ecological contexts where it is used to explain policies for 
allocating scarce life-saving resources. But the language of triage also is 
being used to explain competitive economic and political strategies. For 
example, in a Washington Post story about the small town of Hedrick, 
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Iowa, and its struggle to remain self-sufficient, the reporter notes: 
Such towns are being advised to let go of some of their 
venerable institutions and tie their fate to that of their 
neighbors — merging schools, sharing health services, utilities 
and libraries and promoting themselves as multi-town 
communities. Survival, they are being told by planning 
experts, requires a kind of "economic triage" ~ the targeting of 
limited government resources in a way that allows some 
communities to survive while others are left to decline or die. 
"It's logical," said Harley Johansen, chairman of the 
geography department at the University of Idaho. "We have 
too many small towns for today's rural economy. They simply 
can't all survive" (Vobejda, 1991, p. Al). 
Consequently, according to this reasoning, choices must be made about 
which towns to bolster and which to let die. 
These choices, known in the academic world as triage, are 
already practiced ~ implicitly or explicitly — when housing 
grants, highway funds and economic development aid are 
directed to communities judged to be viable. They are "not 
about turning your back, but making investments in places 
where investments will work and multiply," said Mark 
Lapping, dean of the faculty of planning at Rutgers University 
(p. Al). 
Using much the same rationale, tied to a notion of economic "viability," an 
auto analyst quoted in the Greensboro News & Record explains General 
Motors' decision to shut down twenty-one plants and eliminate at least 
74,000 jobs by 1995 this way: 
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"They [GM managers] don't want to be the Grinch that 
stole Christmas. Most of them were in plants at one 
time or the other." But faced with a crisis, "they are 
performing triage.... You can reduce plants now or you 
can close the company later" ("Economy," 1991, p. B5). 
Another example - Thomas Edsall (1991) of the Washington Post describes 
as political triage a campaign strategy of appealing to "persuadable" voters 
while "writing off sections of the country as unwinnable": The strategy 
involves "such things as conduct polls and focus groups targeted to the 
specific regions of 'persuadable' voters and to various demographic groups 
to determine the kind of issues and strategies that could work to the 
advantage of the Democratic nominee in 1992" (p. A4). 
In an extraordinary story, the Wall Street Tournal (Dahl, 1992) 
describes a shelter for the homeless that sorts, selects, and "feeds ... with an 
uneven hand" the desperate people who come seeking help. A Catholic 
priest in San Diego has founded a luxurious, $15 million "shelter" for the 
homeless premised on the idea that "plush surroundings can restore the 
dignity the homeless need to rejoin society." Selected guests - the 
"motivated or newly homeless" who distinguish themselves through 
diligence in job-looking, regular attendance at shelter classes, and high 
scores on basic skills tests — "earn" the opportunity to stay in semi-private 
bedrooms with telephones and to enjoy gourmet meals. The other 
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homeless people, however — approximately 80 percent who come to the 
place ~ sleep next door in a barracks-style dorm and are served more 
traditional soup-kitchen fare. The "upscale and selective" approach is based 
on what an observer calls "the bootstrap doctrine," which "appeals to 
contributors" because "you definitely get the best bang for your buck this 
way." The priest behind this "country club" for the homeless explains the 
selectivity with the familiar argument that given limited funds, choices 
must be made. And since some of the people who come to the shelter are, 
after all, "lost causes who will never get jobs," why waste the nice perks on 
them? Besides, the inequity (my language) is educational: "In the real 
world, you have to earn nice things," the priest says (pp. Al, A9). 
This story shows how the language and logic of triage have become 
integrated into both the biblical command to care for the poor and the 
needy and the meritocratic ideology of earning and deserving, and how the 
homeless themselves can be used to bridge the gap between these 
discourses. As objects of a putatively meritocratic charity, the homeless 
"allow" their benefactors to become (to borrow Robert Reich's [1991] phrase) 
"virtuous citizens at little [ideological] cost" (p. 278). Pre-selected on the 
criteria of obedience and diligence, the chosen few would seem to be those 
with the greatest potential to act out a meritocratic ideology. Set up as they 
are, therefore, to demonstrate that even among the most desperate some are 
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more deserving than others, the homeless are put in the service of 
confirming the very ideology that legitimates their benefactors' privilege 
and of undercutting the biblical notion that the poor are to be helped 
because they are poor, not because they might, someday, get a job. (The 
biblical idea that the needy are to be helped because they are needy, is, one 
would think, a last bastion against a rationality that sorts and separates the 
worthy and the unworthy or the worthwhile and the useless.) This story 
also shows how the language and logic of triage can be used to perpetuate 
the idea that what is to be provided (what is fair and just) is equal 
opportunity — with the understanding that there will be differential results. 
In all these instances, the language of triage has been extrapolated 
from the tragic, life-and-death situation of soldiers dying on the battlefield 
amidst a scarcity of doctors and medicine and applied in other contexts. 
What concerns me about this is that when triage is seen as an all-purpose 
competitive strategy, the language cloaks in a moral rhetoric a calculating 
rationality that accepts as necessary if not desirable the possibility of 
sorting, selecting, and leaving behind ~ whether the issue is institutions, 
cities, voters, or homeless people. Triage suggests a thoughtful, reasoned 
balancing of ethical and efficiency considerations in the most horrendous of 
emergency situations — situations, however, to which government 
investment policies, corporate decision-making, political campaign 
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strategies, and human compassion are hardly comparable. 
These news stories suggest the complexity and danger of the habits 
of thought reflected in the language and logic of triage. When the process 
of sorting and the practice of rescue is extracted from the battlefield context, 
when an ethic for responding to a life-and-death emergency is used to 
explain (or rationalize) competitive strategies for "success" in business, 
politics, or even the work of charity, efficiency considerations eclipse ethical 
questions and efficiency itself masquerades as morality. In describing 
global economic competition in militaristic terms, A Nation at Risk reflects 
what most charitably might be called this confusion of the ethics of 
emergency decision-making, the mechanics of competition, and the 
preservation of privilege. A Nation at Risk, as I said, assumes a world of 
enemies — enemies within colluding with enemies without: Others have 
become such a threat in part because we (the nation as a whole) have let 
ourselves slide. Within this context, knowledge is commodified, so that the 
point of school becomes the accumulation of intellectual capital 
(ammunition), but, significantly, in the aggregate. The suggestion, hardly 
veiled, is that those who fail to acquire an adequate amount of this capital 
hurt the whole, drag down the others, drain the system. The report, then, 
invokes a nationalist sentiment: We must pull together in the face of serious 
threats. At the same time, however, the report suggests that although we 
all may be in the same boat some people (those who do not know enough) 
are weighing it down. 
In this context the question needs to be raised of whether the call for 
higher standards, more rigid requirements, tougher admissions criteria, and 
so on, constitutes a strategy for "motivating" everyone to learn more or 
whether it amounts to a mechanism for separating the haves and the have-
nots and sorting out the inadequately intellectually capitalized — in other 
words, the surplus people. Along with whatever else it does, the 
nationalistic and militaristic rhetoric of A Nation at Risk provides a moral 
vocabulary and sanction for a cleaner and more consequential process of 
sorting and selecting among students. And, as we know, in times of war 
when the threats are real and the resources scarce, the weak (and the 
unlucky) must be sacrificed for the good of the whole ~ or so the reasoning 
goes. The urgency of war times requires not only general alertness and 
competent performance but also suspension of "everyday" moral 
considerations of means and ends ~ so that ends are seen as justification of 
the means. However, as the public discourse on triage shows up more 
clearly than the Nation at Risk report itself, a game plan for "winning," for 
protecting the interests of a few, all too easily masquerades as an ethical 
response to the most morally challenging of circumstances — a just war. In 
using this language (of a just war) without calling into question its 
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assumptions, A Nation at Risk tacitly equates the welfare of America with 
the need to disenfranchise some Americans. The militaristic language 
justifying higher standards linked to the possibility of disenfranchisement 
presents as moral responsiveness to a serious threat what might just as 
plausibly, even more plausibly, be described as the ideological groundwork 
for a brutal social restructuring. 
My critique of A Nation at Risk is, therefore, essentially a moral one. 
As I see it, the report transgresses moral boundaries in not only condoning 
political disenfranchisement but cloaking such an argument in a 
disingenuous moral rhetoric. The report construes the national interest as 
economic preeminence in a shifting global context and links this "interest" 
with public education in such a way as to put the schools directly in its 
service: Along with whatever else they do, schools are to identify the 
surplus people in a world that wants workers but has too few decent jobs. 
In so doing, the report outlines a strategy for drafting the public schools 
into the work of weakening, not strengthening, the dangerously frayed 
bonds of community in this society. The report also reinforces the 
widespread belief that competition - among nations, citizens, and 
students ~ is inevitable. 
Already, however, I hear that annoying question: Whose "moral 
boundaries?" And to this I can say only that I am speaking out of a 
common sense of morality; that we do, after all, have democratic and 
religious traditions that affirm the dignity and worth of all people and that, 
consequently, rationalization of disenfranchisement is or ought to be 
unthinkable. In this case, however, what of my argument that A Nation at 
Risk warrants critique because of its broad resonance with public fears and 
sensibilities? Without positing some sort of pervasive false consciousness (a 
supposition I do not want to make), what authority does my own moral 
critique have? How can I both set myself apart from dominant sensibilities 
(such as those A Nation at Risk reflects) and claim a measure of critical 
authority based on shared values? 
Let me assume for now that I cannot — that in a racist, sexist, class-
stratified society faith in a notion of critical authority grounded in a shared 
moral sensibility is naive, at best. Instead, perhaps one must turn to some 
notion of analytic rigor or methodological soundness as a ground for 
critical authority. From this perspective, A Nation at Risk invites a less 
condemnatory critique. Indeed, assessed on the basis of the methodology 
employed, the report seems almost exemplary in the sense that it 
contextualizes well the call for educational reform. A Nation at Risk does 
not offer the truncated critique so common among technically oriented and 
pragmatically focused critics determined to keep their analyses within the 
classroom walls. Rather, the report not only acknowledges, affirms, and 
elaborates a relationship between the schools and the broader society, but 
speaks powerfully to real fears and anxieties. However implausible the 
relationship suggested between 1) lazy students, poor curricula, ill-prepared 
teachers and 2) the nation's economic and military power, a critique of 
educational practices so situated does, to its credit, acknowledge that these 
are seriously troubling, even crisis, times and that efforts to reform the 
schools must be efforts to reshape the broader society as well. 
In reducing our complex social crisis to issues of economic 
competitiveness and military might, however, A Nation at Risk ignores the 
breakdown in human community, which our undeniable economic 
problems certainly reflect but nevertheless neither account for nor 
adequately explain. For example, what Marc Miringoff (1992, January 16) 
calls the nation's "social health" has been steadily declining for at least 
twenty years: Child abuse has tripled and suicide among teenagers has 
almost doubled in the last two decades (p. A25). Less than half those 
eligible now vote in national elections — a situation troubling enough in 
itself but even more so because those who don't vote are disproportionately 
poor (Reich, 1991, p. 292). And as our social health has degenerated, 
indices of economic injustice have risen to unheard of levels. The gap 
between rich and poor has swelled dangerously as an unprecedented share 
of the nation's wealth has been vacuumed up by the richest fifth of the 
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population. 
[Between 1977 and 1990] the average incomes of the poorest 
fifth of American families declined by about 7 percent, while 
the average income of the richest fifth of American families 
increased about 15 percent. That left the poorest fifth of 
Americans by 1990 with 3.7 percent of the nation's total 
income, down from 5.5 percent twenty years before — the 
lowest portion they have received since 1954. And it left the 
richest fifth with a bit over half of the nation's income — the 
highest portion ever recorded by the top 20 percent. The top 5 
percent commanded 26 percent of the nation's total income, 
another record (Reich, 1991, p. 197). 
If one looks at wealth (property owned minus debt), the numbers are even 
more alarming. By 1989, The New York Times reported, wealth had 
become so concentrated that "the top 1 percent (834,000 households with 
about $5.7 trillion of net worth) was worth more than the bottom 90 percent 
of Americans (84 million households, with about $4.8 trillion in net worth)" 
(Nasar, 1992, p. Al). 
"The litmus test... for assaying the health of a society," says Robert 
Bellah (1985), "is how it deals with the problem of wealth and poverty." He 
continues: 
The Hebrew prophets took their stand by the 'anawin/ the 
poor and oppressed, and condemned the rich and powerful 
who exploited them.... Classic republican theory from Aristotle 
to the American founders rested on the assumption that free 
institutions could survive in a society only if there were a 
rough equality of condition, that extremes of wealth and 
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poverty are incompatible with a republic.... Contemporary 
social science has documented the consequences of poverty 
and discrimination, so that most educated Americans know 
that much of what makes our world and our neighborhoods 
unsafe arises from economic and racial [and, Bellah should 
have added, gender] inequality (p. 285). 
If we use Bellah's test, contemporary American society clearly is critically 
ill. Never before in this country have rich and poor drifted so far apart. 
Bosses and workers now live in very distinct worlds. 
[By 1988] the chief executive officer of one of America's 
hundred largest corporations received, on average, $2,025,000. 
This was 93 times the wages paid to the average American 
production worker for these corporations. And, given the top 
tax rate was only 28 percent, the CEO took home about 70 
times more than the worker on that line (Reich, 1991, p. 205). 
Graef Crystal, comparing slightly different numbers, found that the typical 
CEO of a major American company now earns approximately 160 times 
what the average American worker earns (Arenson, 1991). 
What is horrifying is not only the injustice of it all, but also the 
relationship between economic injustice and social misery. While 
compensation practices have become so preposterous, social programs that 
would benefit the most desperate have been cut drastically. Indeed, states 
seem to be "competing to make themselves unattractive places for the poor 
to live," remarked a state-budget analyst in light of the 1991 budget cuts in 
cash "safety-net" programs for the poor, which account for only a fraction 
(about 5 percent) of the typical state budget — cuts, that is, that could have 
been avoided ("State budget," 1991). 
A Nation at Risk not only ignores these issues of social health by 
focusing exclusively on the nation's economic competitiveness. The report 
also makes several false assumptions. For one, it assumes that "a school is 
a school," and that since all schools are basically alike, across-the-board 
policies make sense (Metz, 1990, p. 142). Secondly, the report takes for 
granted the idea that more competition inside schools will translate into 
higher productivity levels outside schools and so enhance job opportunities 
(Bastian, 1986, p. 163). Most problematically, however, A Nation at Risk 
accepts at face value the notion of a national interest, supposedly served by 
an intensified intranational competition among citizens, especially students, 
which, it is assumed, will shore up the country's dominance in the 
international marketplace. . 
Reich (1991) offers a thorough critique of such a construction of the 
national interest ~ an argument I want to review because it points to what I 
see as the most serious analytic shortcoming of A Nation at Risk. Despite 
all the talk about how to fix the national economy, Reich argues, we no 
longer have one. Therefore, speculation about how to "jump start" 
American business (one of George Bush's favorite metaphors) amounts to 
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answers to the wrong question: 
Politicians and pundits talk loosely of "restoring" or "restarting" 
American business, as if it were a stalled, broken-down jalopy in 
need of a thorough tune-up. Others offer plans for regaining 
America's competitive edge and revitalizing the American economy. 
Many of these ideas are sound. Some are silly. But all suffer from 
vestigial thinking about exactly what it is that must be restored, 
restarted, regained, or revitalized. They assume as their subject an 
American economy centered upon core American corporations and 
comprising major American industries.... But... this image bears only 
the faintest resemblance to the global economy [of today], in which 
money and information move almost effortlessly through global webs 
of enterprise. There is coming to be no such thing as an American 
corporation or an American industry. The American economy is but 
a region of the global economy (p. 243). 
The idea of an American economy that coheres around a few major 
corporations on whose health and vitality the well-being of Americans 
depends arises out of the belief that all of us, rich and poor alike, are in 
some sense "in the same boat": If the American economy sinks, we all sink, 
the metaphor implies. Reich elaborates: 
[T]he national economic boat is thought to be piloted by a 
number of Americans: the President, the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board, several thousand chief executives of 
major American corporations, the leaders of organized labor; 
and, arrayed around this core group, the executives of smaller 
American companies, investors and venture capitalists, and a 
wide-ranging collection of scientists, inventors, and 
entrepreneurs. Americans depend on these "pilots." Their 
collective wisdom, foresight, and ambition spell the difference 
between national prosperity and stagnation. Other Americans 
must faithfully do their parts as well, of course. All must 
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work hard, save as much as possible, and inculcate in their 
children similar habits of diligence and frugality (p. 4). 
Other nations' economies similarly are imagined to resemble boats 
"competing with each other in a worldwide regatta whose prize is economic 
preeminence." And because "boats that are in the lead at one point in 
history may fall behind at another time ... we must maintain our vigilance" 
(p. 5). 
Whafs wrong here, Reich (1991) argues, is that, despite the "clarity 
and soothing comprehensibility" of the economy-as-boat picture, it is no 
longer true (p. 5). The economic well-being of any single American 
depends not on the relative competitiveness of a few major corporations or 
even of the society as a whole, but rather on the functions she herself 
performs in the global economy. 
Americans thus confront global competition ever more directly, 
unmediated by national institutions. As we discard vestigial 
notions of the competitiveness of American corporations, 
American industry, and the American economy, and recast 
them in terms of the competitiveness of the American work 
force, it becomes apparent that successes or failures will not be 
shared equally be all our citizens. 
Some Americans, whose contributions to the global 
economy are more highly valued in world markets, will 
succeed, while others, whose contributions are deemed far less 
valuable, fail (p. 172). 
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More specifically, and in terms of the three-way division of labor 
Reich (1991) describes, the fortunes of symbolic analysts are rising and 
likely will continue to rise, while those of service workers are falling, 
although not as quickly as those of the most precariously positioned routine 
production workers. Routine production work, marked by the performance 
of repetitive tasks, includes traditional blue-collar jobs but also supervisory 
jobs that entail doing the same thing over and over and by compensation 
based on either the amount of work done or time put in. In-person service 
workers, like production workers, perform simple, repetitive tasks and are 
paid by the hour or the job, but unlike production workers, interact face-to-
face with customers and clients — retail sales clerks, waiters and waitresses, 
and hospital attendants, for example. 
In-person servers are supposed to be as punctual, reliable, and 
tractable as routine production workers. But many in-person 
servers share one additional requirement: They must also have 
a pleasant demeanor. They must smile and exude confidence 
and good cheer, even when they feel morose. They must be 
courteous and helpful, even to the most obnoxious of patrons. 
Above all, they must make others feel happy and at ease (pp. 
176-77). 
Consequently, "It should come as no surprise that, traditionally, most in-
person servers have been women" (p. 177). Symbolic analysts, more 
privileged in every way than the production and service workers, 
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manipulate symbols - "data, words, oral and visual representations" (p. 
177). Included in this group are engineers, consultants, and analysts of all 
sorts; lawyers, public relations executives, art directors, and film editors; 
journalists, musicians, and professors. 
Symbolic analysts solve, identify, and broker problems by 
manipulating symbols.... Some of these manipulations reveal how to 
more efficiently deploy resources or shift financial assets, or 
otherwise save time and energy. Other manipulations yield new 
inventions - technological marvels, innovative legal arguments, new 
advertising ploys for convincing people that certain amusements 
have become life necessities. Still other manipulations — of sounds, 
words, pictures — serve to entertain their recipients, or cause them to 
reflect more deeply on their lives or on the human condition. Others 
grab money from people too slow or naive to protect themselves by 
manipulating in response (p. 178). 
Only the symbolic analysts are faring well (for the most part very well) in a 
global market. American production workers can neither out-produce nor 
subsist on lower pay than their counterparts around the world, and the 
service workers increasing are competing with the cast-out production 
workers to hold on to their usually quite poorly compensated jobs. The 
fortunes of the symbolic analysts, however, depend on the fortunes of none 
of these workers but rather on the value of their skills and abilities in a 
global market. 
Given this lopsided economic dependence, the critical question of 
social responsibility arises. What, if anything, holds together American 
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culture as distinct from an American economy? 
The underlying question concerns ... the fate of the majority of 
Americans who are losing out in global competition. The 
answer will depend on whether there is still enough concern 
about American society to elicit sacrifices from all of us ~ 
especially from the most advantaged and successful of us — to 
help the majority regain the ground it has lost and fully 
participate in the new global economy.... Are we still a society, 
even if we are no longer an economy? Are we bound together 
by something more than the gross national product? Or has 
the idea of the nation-state as a collection of people sharing 
some responsibility for their mutual well-being become passe? 
(Reich, 1991, p. 9). 
In other words, do moral ties among American citizens exist in the absence 
of economic interdependency? Is there a national interest that transcends 
our no-longer-shared economic interests? Reich (1991) describes troubling 
patterns that suggest not: 
With each sought-after reduction in their taxes, symbolic 
analysts in effect withdraw their dollars from the support of 
public spaces shared by all and dedicate the savings to private 
spaces they share with other symbolic analysts. As public 
parks and playgrounds deteriorate, there is a proliferation of 
private health clubs, golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating clubs, and 
every other type of recreational association in which costs are 
divided up among members. So also with condominiums, 
cooperatives, and the omnipresent "residential communities" 
which dun their members in order to undertake efforts that 
financially strapped local governments can no longer afford to 
do well — maintaining private roadways, mending sidewalks, 
pruning trees, repairing streetlights, cleaning swimming pools 
and paying for a lifeguard, and notably — hiring security 
guards to protect life and property (p. 269). 
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These private security guards, which have doubled in number as a 
percentage of the work force, now outnumber public police officers in the 
United States (p. 269). The poorest four-fifths of the population, however, 
hesitates to ask much of more fortunate Americans: 
The reason is economic. The rest of the population is 
dependent upon how and where symbolic analysts decide to 
dedicate their energies and money. The dependence of in-
person servers is direct; wealthy symbolic analysts in their 
midst attract money from the rest of the world and spend a 
part of it on local services. Routine producers, although not 
dependent on American symbolic analysts exclusively, 
nonetheless rely on the decisions of strategic brokers of 
whatever nationality to give them work and, hopefully, to train 
them to become more valuable and productive (Reich, 1991, p. 
294). 
In this climate, when whole groups of people are fearful of even broaching 
the subject of justice, it is politically possible to talk, for example, about the 
evils of a national health care system or the inadvisability of raising the 
minimum wage. All the social misery, however, need not provoke a 
guilty conscience in the sense that it is largely hidden — because the "one 
thing Americans increasingly have in common with their neighbors ... is 
their income levels" (Reich, 1991, p. 277). Symbolic analysts tend to live in 
economic enclaves that shield them from insight into or even awareness of 
the plights of others. 
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Since almost everyone in [the] "community" is by definition as 
well off as they are, there is no cause for a stricken conscience. 
If inhabitants of another neighborhood are poorer, let them 
look to one another. Why should we pay for their schools? So 
the argument goes, without acknowledging that the critical 
assumption has already been made: "we" and "they" belong to 
fundamentally different communities. Through such reasoning 
it has become possible to maintain a preferred self-image of 
generosity toward, and solidarity with, one's "community" 
without owing any responsibility to "them," in another 
"community" (Reich, 1991, p. 278). 
However, if "we" and "they" do not comprise an inclusive moral 
community, in what sense does a national interest exist at all? 
A Nation at Risk fails to ask this question. Consequently, we might 
fault the report not only for its reductionistic view of the social context of 
education (it reduces our massive and complex social crisis to a 
manipulable economic problem), but also for taking at face value a notion 
of such moral and political significance as "the national interest." Finally, 
despite its rhetorical power, the report fails to offer any insight into the 
historical context, political dimensions, or moral significance of the deep-
seated anxieties and destructive fears of losing out that it plays into. 
Still, the real problem with A Nation at Risk has less to do with these 
analytic or methodological shortcomings than with its moral import. A 
critique of Bloom's Closing of the American Mind will, I hope, clarify the 
distinction I want to make between 1) critiquing the methodology of a 
critical text and 2) pointing (usually with alarm) to its moral and political 
implications. Problems arise, I want to argue, when these different critical 
strategies are confused. Bloom (1987) grounds his critique of university 
curricula (centered no longer on unified sets of core courses emphasizing 
classic texts) in the widespread anomie and confusion he sees in his 
admittedly quite-privileged students and in his sense that real philosophy 
has been all but undermined by a pervasive and debilitating moral 
relativism — the legacy of Nietzsche as refracted through American culture. 
Critics across the political spectrum have critiqued Bloom's argument. 
Here, I want to focus on Martha Nussbaum's (1987) and Aronowitz and 
Giroux's (1991) critiques of Bloom because they raise important questions 
not only about his argument but also about the strategies or methods of 
educational criticism. 
Nussbaum's (1987) critique of Bloom is essentially methodological. 
Bloom's historical analysis of the concept of relativism is "idiosyncratic," she 
says. Further, he makes unfounded, sweeping statements about "students" 
and "American culture"; his scholarship is "vague and offhand"; his 
argument contains "gaps and errors"; and he ignores important texts in 
Greek philosophy (those that contradict his thesis) while claiming to ground 
his argument in the wisdom of "the ancients." In short, his scholarship is 
poor: "How good a philosopher, then, is Allan Bloom?" Nussbaum asks. 
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"The answer is, we cannot say, and we are given no reason to think him 
one at all. His book is long on rhetoric, painfully short on argument." 
Bloom pretends to be a philosopher when he isn't, tries to pass off as 
serious argumentation what is little more than empty rhetoric, and lacks 
humility, Nussbaum suggests: "Bloom knows that he knows. Socrates knew 
that he didn't" (pp. 20-26). However, all this lays the groundwork for the 
moral argument that, it seems, is the one Nussbaum (1987) really wants to 
make: 
Bloom is really proposing that the function of the entire 
American university system should be to perfect and then 
protect a few contemplative souls, whose main subject matter 
will, apparently, be the superiority of their own contemplative 
life to the moral and political life.... The real problem with 
Bloom's advice on curriculum is the problem of the book as a 
whole: that it is not informed by concern for the diverse needs 
of diverse groups of American students (pp. 24-25). 
In other words, the problem with Bloom is that he is elitist and that his 
plans for reform of university curricular are not in the broader public's 
interest. 
In terms of critical strategy (as well as political orientation), 
Aronowitz and Giroux's (1991) critique of Bloom resembles Nussbaum's. 
They commend Bloom for reminding us "of what has been lost in the drive 
for rationalization, for the supremacy of science over philosophy, history 
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over eternal essences" (p. 33). They quickly add, however, that Bloom's 
"sweeping claims," made "without a shred of evidence," amount to a 
"hyperbolic tirade" - all of which casts doubt on his scholarship, which 
amounts to little more than "scapegoating" and "invective" (pp. 29, 32). 
Bloom, Aronowitz and Giroux point out, "seeks to restore ... belief in the 
transhistorical permanence of forms of truth" — a project that requires (as 
Nussbaum also suggests) "an unproblematic, quasi-essentialist, and elitist 
reading of history" (pp. 27, 37). 
Yet, however true this may be, Aronowitz and Giroux's (1991) 
critique of Bloom, like Nussbaum's, seems driven less by offense at shoddy 
historical analysis than by alarm in the face of the moral and political 
import of his argument. The Closing of the American Mind, Aronowitz 
and Giroux argue, represents "a new cultural offensive," a battle over 
textual authority: 
[T]his offensive represents a form of textual authority that not 
only legitimates a particular version of Western civilization as 
well as an elitist notion of the canon, but also serves to exclude 
all those other discourses, whether from the new social 
movements or from other sources of opposition, which attempt 
to establish different grounds for the production and 
organization of knowledge (p. 26). 
And the battle over what knowledge is most important is, of course, also 
about who is most important: 
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[Bloom] yearns for the return of a more rigidly stratified 
civilization in which the crowd is contained within the land of 
the marketplace and its pleasures are confined to the rituals of 
the carnival. What he wants to exclude are the majority of the 
population from the precincts of reason. At the same time, he 
would drive the vox populi from the genuine academy where 
the Absolute Spirit should find a home, but does not, because 
of the confusion that reigns amidst the dangerous and flabby 
influence of the discourses of social commitment, politics, and 
equality (pp. 30-31). 
Consequently, 
What Bloom means by reform is nothing less than an effort to 
make explicit what women, minorities, and working-class 
students have always known: the precincts of higher learning 
are not for them, and the educational system is meant to train 
a new mandarin class (p. 36). 
Bloom's book marks a shift in the discourse, Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) 
argue, from an emphasis on schools as sites for the production of technical 
expertise and an "improved" work ethic to an emphasis on schools as sites 
of cultural production. In this context, Bloom's call for curricular reform 
amounts to a strategic move in a broader struggle "over the relationship 
between knowledge and power as well as ... the construction and 
development of the political subject" (p. 27). At stake in all this, therefore, 
is the question not only of what and whose knowledge counts, but also of 
the shape and morality of political society. In sum, Aronowitz and Giroux 
contextualize The Closing of the American Mind in the broader discourse of 
84 
educational reform and in the wider political battles fought on 
philosophical terrain. At the same time, their critique of Bloom, like 
Nussbaum's, is largely a moral critique advanced, however, along 
methodological lines ~ not wholly so, but in part. This strategy raises what 
I believe are important questions about the practice of educational/cultural 
criticism - questions I perhaps can focus best by returning to my critique of 
Mann's description of curriculum criticism. 
The work of curriculum criticism, Mann (1975) argues, proceeds 
through a methodology of moral discernment wherein the critic's task is to 
disclose the meanings a curriculum contains by explaining its design in 
such a way as to show the nature of its influence. But in what sense are 
meanings in a curriculum — in what sense, that is, do meanings inhere in a 
design able to be discovered by insightful critics and in what sense are they 
rather created in light of a curriculum's broader moral and political context? 
Richard Johnson's (1986) exploration of questions like this one provides a 
perspective on Mann's work. The cultural critic's task, Johnson suggests, is 
less to discover than to construct. Critique, the methodology of cultural 
studies as he sees it, is 
not criticism merely, nor even polemic, but procedures by 
which other traditions are approached both for what they may 
yield and for what they inhibit. Critique involves stealing 
away the more useful elements and rejecting the rest. From 
85 
this point of view cultural studies is a process, a kind of 
alchemy for producing useful knowledge (p. 38). 
For Johnson, therefore, critique is a practice of selecting and forging — 
picking and choosing among aspects and insights of various traditions to 
construct a useful analytic framework. Eagleton (1991) offers a different 
(but compatible) definition of critique (quoted in Chapter 1): "that form of 
discourse which seeks to inhabit the experience of the subject from the 
inside, in order to elicit those 'valid' features of that experience which point 
beyond the subject's present condition" (xiv). To this might be added . 
Michael Walzer's (1988) comments about criticism's grounding in a sense of 
hope and possibility: 
Perhaps there is one common mark of the critical enterprise. It 
is founded in hope; it cannot be carried on without some sense 
of historical possibility. Criticism is oriented toward the 
future: the critic must believe that the conduct of his fellows 
can conform more closely to a moral standard than it now does 
or that their self-understanding can be greater than it now is or 
that their institutions can be more justly organized then they 
now are (p. 17). 
From Johnson, Eagleton, and Walzer I would generalize that critique 
proceeds, at least in part, through affirmation ~ a process of culling 
through the historical memory of personal experience as well as intellectual 
tradition for that which sustains hope and promises a new and better 
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world. Critique, therefore, requires some evaluative criteria; and good 
critique, it seems, requires articulation of those criteria or of the premises of 
one's judgment. West (1991) puts this well in calling for affirmation and 
self-disclosure on the part of those who would throw their intellectual 
abilities into the struggle for a better world: 
This means, in part, a wholesale critical inventory of ourselves 
and our communities of struggle. More pointedly, the 
existential and ethical dimensions of our lives require serious 
scrutiny. Why do we still fight and hope for social change? 
What really sustains our faith in struggle and our hope for 
change in these barbaric times? How do we analyze and 
account for the egalitarian values and democratic sensibilities 
we act upon? (p. xiii). 
This kind of personal affirmation is, I suggest, what is missing not 
only in A Nation and Risk and The Closing of the American Mind, but also, 
and maybe especially, in Nussbaum's and in Aronowitz and Giroux's 
critiques of Bloom. Their criticisms seem to be not really that Bloom sorts 
and selects among the texts of Greek philosophy to make the argument he 
wants to make, but rather that he sorts and selects towards the wrong end 
or in the wrong direction. In other words, the real problem is the criteria 
by which he sorts and selects ~ that is, what he affirms, which is an elitism 
in which the rational search for "the good" and "the true" is both the means 
and end of privilege. Whereas Bloom's fundamental affirmation seems to 
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be the legitimacy of privilege, A Nation at Risk seems most fundamentally 
to affirm competition — its the value, its inevitability, and therefore its 
effects (the production of losers as well as winners). 
As difficult as it is to see competition and privilege as affirmations, 
Nussbaum and Aronowitz and Giroux in some ways offer an even greater 
challenge. Nussbaum's (1987) central affirmation, it seems, is of a 
democratic conception of philosophy as "the active use of practical reason, 
which seems to be the common and universal possession of all humans" — 
which, she points out, has important educational implications: 
[I]f, as Socrates said, "the unexamined life is not worth living 
for a human being," it might seem to follow that a society 
dedicated to securing, for its members, the conditions of a full 
and worthwhile life would have a duty to make sure that they 
could get this higher education (p. 25). 
Aronowitz and Giroux's (1991) central affirmation, it seems, is of a 
methodology — that of "appropriation" of tradition — although they clearly 
intend for this approach to be put in the service of specific moral and 
political ends (those of radical democracy): 
Above all, the canon must justify itself as representing the 
elements of our own heritage. In the final instance, it is to be 
appropriated rather than revered -- and, with this 
appropriation, transformed. The canon, then, is to be pressed 
into the service of definite ends — which frees us from the yoke 
of acknowledging it as the unquestioned embodiment of Truth, 
even as it remains unread (p. 38). 
These affirmations (of a conception of philosophy and a relationship to 
tradition) are important. However, I want to argue, they need to be 
translated into terms that connect with people's lives. Nussbaum comes 
close in suggesting that taking Socrates seriously means making sure that 
anyone who wants to go to college can, and Giroux and Aronowitz 
approach this in describing the canon as a yoke around our necks. But 
their arguments, to my mind, remain too abstract and too disconnected 
from the substance of day-to-day life to really inspire or engage the reader. 
This critique of some of the criticism (Nussbaum's and Aronowitz 
and Giroux's) of educational criticism (Bloom's) raises this question for me: 
If the central task of educational criticism is not to protect (in part through 
upholding methodological standards) the integrity of a field of inquiry 
(education), what is the task and what are its tools? If the task of 
educational criticism is to critique the social and cultural context of 
education, it involves judgment of the moral foundations of the broader 
society and culture ~ that is, critique of the habits of thought and social 
practices that perpetuate injustice and provoke hopelessness and despair. 
Consequently, then, educational criticism requires moral argumentation that 
perhaps includes but nevertheless surpasses issues of analytic rigor and 
methodological soundness. 
The actual practice of educational criticism, however, does not 
demonstrate this. Instead of educational criticism as powerful and 
persuasive moral argument, we seem to have for the most part either 
powerful and persuasive apologies for fear-driven worldviews in which 
justice is a non-issue (A Nation at Risk, for example) or insightful, even 
brilliant, analyses of the causes or etiology of injustice mixed with 
disparaging remarks about other critics' competence (Nussbaum's and 
Aronowitz and Giroux's critiques of Bloom, for example). With the respect 
to Aronowitz and Giroux's critique, one thinks of Dostoyevsky's Ivan 
Karamazov, who advances incisive social critique through his extraordinary 
powers of critical rationality - and of the monk, Father Zossima, who 
observes that Ivan seems not even to believe his own arguments. 
My criticism of Bloom's critics is, I realize, too harsh. I overstate the 
case, however, to point to what I believe is a real problem in educational 
criticism - the lack of powerful and persuasive moral argument. Assuming 
that this kind of argument is or ought to be an important tool of 
educational critics, a host of questions arise: Is the lack of forceful moral 
argument a function of professional standards of scholarship that constrict 
and constrain the discourse? Or is it a broader educational problem ~ 
when and where are the skills of moral argumentation taught? If they are 
not taught at all, why not? And what are the cultural dimensions of this 
problem? Does the substance of contemporary educational criticism reflect 
a broader cultural confusion about the status of moral critique altogether? 
Let me hold these questions in abeyance for now, and turn next to the 
literature of critical pedagogy, an important strain of criticism that boldly 
affirms its moral impetus and offers a thorough critique of such educational 
criticism as A Nation at Risk and The Closing of the American Mind, but a 




THE PRACTICE OF EDUCATIONAL CRITICISM II: PEDAGOGY OF THE 
OPPRESSED AND SCHOOLING AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PUBLIC LIFE 
Conservative ideology, as I have argued, has shaped the most recent 
wave of interest in educational reform. The popular calls for intensified 
competition, higher standards, and more stringent mechanisms of 
accountability (like those put forth in A Nation at Risk) reflect and promote 
a view of education that links schools, often directly, to the struggle to 
increase "the nation's" economic strength and military might. The only 
serious alternative voice in the educational reform debate has been the far 
less popular but far more thoughtful, cogent, and well developed 
educational criticism found in the critical pedagogy literature — the 
tradition of criticism in which I have been schooled and the one with which 
I identify most closely. This radical criticism has called attention to the 
political import of texts like A Nation at Risk (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985, 
for example), has pointed to the continuing injustices the conservative 
criticism has failed to address (Bastian et alv 1986, for example), and has 
sought to tie the aims of education not to concerns about the nation's 
economic and military power, but rather to hopes for the realization of a 
truly participatory democracy (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, for example). 
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The critical pedagogy literature, shaped by the Critical Social Theory 
of the Frankfurt School, has evolved most directly out of the work of the 
Brazilian educator and educational theorist Paulo Freire. Freire's writings, 
the best known of which is his Pedagogy of the Oppressed, have influenced 
the development of radical educational theory and practice in and outside 
this country. 
Paulo Freire is without question the most influential theorist of 
critical or liberatory education. His theories have profoundly 
influenced literacy programs throughout the world and what 
has come to be called critical pedagogy in the United States. 
His theoretical works ... provide classic statements of liberatory 
or critical pedagogy based on universal claims of truth (Weiler, 
1991, p. 450). 
Freire's teachings have been applied to the American cultural context by, 
among many others, Henry Giroux, Michael Apple, and Peter McClaren. 
The critical pedagogy these writers espouse has been criticized for its 
almost-exclusive concern with issues of power, for its abstract and at-times 
esoteric language, and for its masculinist assumptions (Ellsworth, 1989, for 
example). Nevertheless, this literature has carried forward the 
reconceptualists' concern with issues of social justice and human freedom in 
a time when these ideals have been dangerously and conspicuously absent 
from the public discourse on education. 
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For purposes of critique of the critical pedagogy literature I will focus 
on two texts: first, Freire's foundational statement, Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, then Giroux's Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life: 
Critical Pedagogy in the Modern Age. My intent is to provide, through 
critique of Freire's book, a sense of where the educational criticism found in 
the critical pedagogy literature comes from and, through critique of 
Giroux's, some sense of what it looks like today. I focus on Giroux's book 
because he is perhaps the most prolific and certainly among the best known 
and most influential contemporary theorists of critical pedagogy (Purpel, 
1991, p. 82). 
Freire (1990) critiques what he calls the banking concept of education, 
wherein the supposedly all-knowing teacher fills the minds of the allegedly 
know-nothing students who then demonstrate their mastery by filing away 
information, retrievable on demand. This pedagogy ends up dehumanizing 
those it purports to educate: 
Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques 
and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, 
memorize, and repeat. This is the "banking" concept of 
education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students 
extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the 
deposits.... [I]n the last analysis, it is men themselves who are 
filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and 
knowledge in this (at best) misguided system (p. 58). 
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This all-too-familiar form of schooling, Freire insists, teaches the poor and 
the powerless not to critique the oppressive relations of power in which 
they are bound, but rather to accept a static view of the world and of 
themselves that precludes the possibility of transformation. For Freire, 
therefore, pedagogy is eminently political and relations of power, eminently 
pedagogical. 
Against a static view of the world and the schooling that helps 
perpetuate it, Freire (1990) preaches that men (one assumes he means 
women, too, but his language does not reflect this) are and must come to 
see themselves as always becoming other than they are. Consequently, the 
humanly constructed world itself is always in the process of change. 
Coming to feel this sense of possibility (conscientizacao) requires not 
banking education but its alternative, problem-posing education, wherein 
students and teachers alike intervene in the oppressive reality that thwarts 
efforts towards humanization. Such intervention proceeds through the 
praxis of dialogue, reflection, and action: 
It is only when the oppressed find the oppressor out and 
become involved in the organized struggle for their liberation 
that they begin to believe in themselves. This discovery cannot 
be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be 
limited to mere activism, but must include serious reflection: 
only then will it be a praxis (Freire, 1990, p. 52). 
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At the heart of this pedagogy is the resolution of what Freire calls the 
teacher-student contradiction, a relationship that often mirrors that of 
oppressed and oppressors in the broader society. Joined in a mutual 
struggle to name and intervene in an oppressive world, teachers become 
teacher-students and students, student-teachers, and the curriculum arises 
out of the dialogical relationship among these teacher-students and student-
teachers: 
[T]he dialogical character of education as the practice of 
freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets with 
the students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, but rather 
when the former first asks himself what he will dialogue with 
the latter about (Freire, 1990, pp. 81-82). 
Freire's (1990) pedagogical and political philosophy rests on two 
important assumptions about human nature and the nature of reality: 1) 
there is an objective reality (one of oppression), which can be "unveiled" 
through a process of dialogue and reflection; and 2) this process of 
unveiling, although often thwarted, reflects an ontological will toward 
humanization and desire for "a world in which it will be easier to love" (p. 
24). Movement in this direction requires overcoming or resolving the 
oppressed/oppressor contradiction. The hope, for Freire, is not to upend 
the hierarchy (so that the oppressed come to dominate and exploit their 
former oppressors), but rather to transform human relations so that love 
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and communion are possible. Transformation will come, however, only 
through opposition and struggle. The oppressed must oppose their 
oppressors, violently if necessary, in the interest of the humanization and 
liberation of all: 
[I]t is — paradoxical though it may seem — precisely in the 
response of the oppressed to the violence of their oppressors 
that a gesture of love may be found. Consciously or 
unconsciously, the act of rebellion by the oppressed (an act 
which is always, or nearly always, as violent as the initial 
violence of the oppressors) can initiate love.... As the 
oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors' 
power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the 
oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of 
oppression (p. 42). 
In the sense that Freire believes only power "that springs from the 
weakness of the oppressed" can free both the oppressed and their 
oppressors, he grounds his faith in the victims of an unjust social order and 
affirms for them a certain epistemological privilege: 
Who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the 
terrible significance of an oppressive society? Who suffer the 
effects of oppression more than the oppressed? Who can better 
understand the necessity of liberation? (pp. 28-29). 
Central to Freire's (1990) thought, therefore, is a profound faith in 
transformative possibility. Although "both humanization and 
dehumanization are possibilities for man as an uncompleted being 
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conscious of his incompletion," the will toward humanization can be 
thwarted but never eradicated, Freire insists: 
This vocation [of humanization] is constantly negated, yet it is 
affirmed by that very negation. It is thwarted by injustice, 
exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it 
is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and 
justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity.... 
Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or 
later being less than human leads the oppressed to struggle 
against those who made them so (pp. 27-28). 
Freire's great contribution to educational theory and criticism is to lay out a 
political philosophy, epistemology, and pedagogy consistent with and 
supportive of such Utopian ideals. 
Although Giroux does not use Freire's quasi-religious language, he 
continues the tradition of framing educational theory in terms of politically 
emancipatory ideals. In Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life Giroux 
(1988b) develops a critical theory of citizenship education grounded in a 
democratic public philosophy. Giroux rejects the idea that democratic 
ideals can "be grounded in any transcendent notion of truth or authority," 
and offers instead the outlines of a public philosophy, the rudiments of an 
educational theory, and a view of "citizenship" that reinforce and help 
legitimate each other (p. 28). He explains the project this way: 
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[Critical literacy and citizenship education [can] provide the 
rationale for developing schools as democratic public spheres 
... places where students learn the knowledge and skills of 
citizenship within forms of solidarity that provide the basis for 
constructing emancipatory forms of community life. What this 
suggests is that a public philosophy is needed that links the 
purpose of schooling to the development of forms of 
knowledge and moral character in which citizenship is defined 
as an ethical compact, not a commercial contract, and 
empowerment is related to forms of self- and social formation 
that encourage people to participate critically in shaping public 
life (pp. 34-35). 
Giroux's project, therefore, is to link radical democratic ideals with 
educational theory in such a way as to justify an explicitly moral and 
political view of schooling ~ a project Giroux situates against what he calls 
the conservative preoccupation not with citizenship but rather with a 
narrow patriotism "made synonymous with the tenets of economic 
productivity and national defense" (p. 17). 
Giroux (1988b) develops his argument through critique of the radical 
educational theory with which he is affiliated. While a tone of outrage and 
indignation pervades this discourse, Giroux argues, the lack of a 
substantive social vision blunts its force: 
[M]oral indignation has often been expressed in a language 
paralyzed by skepticism and unable to move beyond the 
limited task of charting and registering the failure of American 
schooling. Lost from this perspective is any attempt at 
recovering and building upon those forms of subjectivity and a 
collective struggle rooted in a creative, self-transforming, life-
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enhancing morality which the dominant culture so actively 
conceals and precludes whenever possible (p. 37). 
Giroux's response to the "paralysis" he describes is to urge educators and 
educational theorists to infuse their discourse with a language of hope and 
Utopian possibility and to develop a "provisional morality" as part of an 
ongoing attempt to articulate a resonant and historically contextualized 
social vision. As he puts it, 
Developing a provisional morality that points to the adequacy 
of naming certain norms as emancipatory and others as 
repressive represents a major challenge for educators.... No less 
challenging is the need to reconstruct and critically appropriate 
those historically constituted traditions of protest that might 
provide the basis for organizing everyday experiences around 
a language that promotes radical needs and emancipatory 
sensibilities (p. 60). 
This, of course, is Giroux's own project: to link a resonant public 
philosophy with a compelling moral discourse supportive of a rationale for 
public schooling that legitimates and furthers democratic ideals. 
I have juxtaposed Freire's and Giroux's books not only to try to show 
the focus of some of the critical pedagogy literature, but also because I 
believe reading Giroux against Freire offers an important perspective on the 
development of critical pedagogy in general and on Giroux's work in 
particular. In this context, let me go back to Freire. His teaching is shaped 
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by an overarching concern for social, political, and historical relevance. 
Freire worked out his ideas in the context of the egregious oppression and 
grinding poverty of the Third World (Brazil), and has warned against 
extrapolating his pedagogy and its rationale wholesale (Schilb, 1985, p. 258). 
That said, Freire unquestionably has made a major contribution to 
educational theory and pedagogical practice. His teachings continue to be 
critiqued and interpreted by scholars in and outside the profession of 
education (Weiler, 1991, Elbow, 1986, and Schilb, 1985, for example). 
Nevertheless, efforts to appropriate Freire raise important issues of 
context, among which surely are these: How oppressed are college and 
university students in the United States (the primary participants, happily 
so or not, in most efforts toward liberatory pedagogy) compared with the 
Brazilian peasants with whom Freire worked? How useful are the 
dichotomous categories "oppressed" and "oppressor" in the United States 
where race, class, and gender intersect so deceptively? How resonant is 
Freire's language of conversion and redemption in America, given our 
concerns about separation of church and state, especially with respect to the 
public schools? On the other hand, how compelling is Freirian theory, 
fraught as it is with paradox and infused as it is with radical hope, when 
extracted from a narrative of conversion and redemption? I want to take 
up each of these questions as a way of trying to clarify Freire's significance 
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for contemporary educational criticism in this country. 
1. How oppressed are college and university students in the United 
States? Schilb (1985) says he believes his own students (first- and second-
year students at a private university) are oppressed, but their oppression is 
more ideological than material: 
The students have undeniably escaped the pain of extreme material 
want. However, they can be thought of as entrapped in a certain 
profound fatalism. Unaware of the conceivable relationships between 
one institution and another, one historical event and another, one 
human being and another, they themselves experience life as a fragile 
web of monadic units that cannot afford to depend too much on the 
prospect of mutual aid. Given their own apprehension of culture as 
incorrigibly opaque, they follow the specific edicts of their parents 
and the general doctrine of social Darwinism as the only means of 
mental and physical survival.... But they do suffer doubts and inner 
schisms, exacerbated by their continued blindness to social relations 
and their continued reliance on ideological cliches (p. 259). 
If Schilb is right in his characterization of his students' oppression, the 
pedagogical question arises of how effectively fatalism, excessive self-doubt, 
and so vulnerability to the brutality of social Darwinist thinking (and the 
meritocratic ideology that buttresses it) can be addressed and transformed 
through the tools of critical dialogue and reflection. Breaking out of these 
habits of thought would seem to require a consciousness not only of one's 
own oppression but also of an alternative reality in which sacrifice or 
relinquishment of the psychological and material investments in a 
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meritocratic ideology makes sense: Why should we who are able to "win" 
the competition for decent work, some measure of material security, and 
some degree of power and authority critique not just "the rules of the 
game," but the whole metaphor of life as a game — a contest with winners 
and losers? Certainly we should, but I wonder whether the question of 
why can be addressed meaningfully within the confines of critical 
rationality. Perhaps it can. I raise this as a question, however, because of 
my own suspicion that critical rationality is so wedded to ideas about the 
value of self-interest that sacrifice as real sacrifice (something valuable 
really is given up and not replaced) will always be written off as irrational. 
2. How useful are the categories "oppressed" and "oppressor" in the 
United States where race, class, and gender intersect so deceptively? 
Kathleen Weiler (1991) speaks to this in her critique of Freirian theory ~ a 
critique that arises out of the realization, she says, that in feminist 
classrooms the interpersonal dynamics call into question some of Freire's 
assumptions. For example, 
Feminist educational critics ... want to retain the vision of 
social justice and transformation that underlies liberatory 
pedagogies, but they find that their claims to universal truths 
and their assumptions of a collective experience of oppression 
do not adequately address the realities of their own confusing 
and often tension-filled classrooms (p. 450). 
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Oppression is more complex than Freire suggests, Weiler says — a 
misunderstanding, she believes, that ends up supporting anti-liberatory 
pedagogical practices because the complexity of the teacher-student 
relationship, for example, thereby escapes critique. In appropriating 
Freirian theory, Weiler says, theorists and practitioners of feminist 
pedagogy must take into account not only the conflicts that arise from the 
divided consciousness Freire describes (wherein the oppressed internalize 
the consciousness of their oppressors). Conflicts among social groups and 
between teachers and students also must be addressed. For if not, 
[T]he conflicts among groups trying to work together to name 
and struggle against oppression — among teachers and 
students in classrooms, or among political groups working for 
change in very specific areas ~ can lead to anger, frustration, 
and a retreat to safer or more traditional approaches [than 
Freirian or feminist pedagogies] (p. 451). 
Addressing these conflicts requires that "the goals of justice" be framed 
"more specifically in the context of historically defined struggles" and that 
the interests and identities of teachers and theorists as well as students be, 
at the very least, named (p. 451). 
A Freirian view of the world (as constituted by the oppressed and 
their oppressors) not only oversimplifies the nature of social conflict, Weiler 
(1991) says, but ignores the complexity of oppression at the level of 
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subjectivity: 
What is not addressed is the possibility of simultaneous 
contradictory positions of oppression and dominance: the man 
oppressed by his boss could at the same time oppress his wife, 
for example, or the White woman oppressed by sexism could 
exploit the Black woman. By framing his discussion in such 
abstract terms, Freire slides over the contradictions and tension 
within social settings in which overlapping forms of 
oppression exist (p. 453). 
This is a problem because a pedagogy that fails to take into account the 
contradictions and complexities of oppression is too quick to assume that 
the teacher is "on the same side" as the oppressed, and that as 
teachers and students engage together in a dialogue about the 
world, they will uncover together the same reality, the same 
oppression, and the same liberation (p. 454). 
These observations bring Weiler to call for a more situated theory of 
oppression and subjectivity and for self-disclosure on the part of educators: 
The recognition of our own histories means the necessity of 
articulating our own subjectivities and our own interests as we 
try to interpret and critique the social world. This stance 
rejects the universalizing tendency of much "malestream" 
thought, and insists on recognizing the power and privilege of 
who we are (p. 469). 
Recognizing "the power and privilege of who we are" in turn requires 
accepting responsibility for our own implication in an unjust social order ~ 
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the only alternative to which is the denial and evasion born of privilege: 
The claim to a lack of identity or positionality is itself based on 
privilege, on the refusal to accept responsibility for one's 
implication in actual historical or social relations, or a denial 
that positionalities exist or that they matter, the denial of one's 
own personal history and the claim to a total separation from 
it (Martin & Mohanty in Weiler, 1991, p. 469). 
As insightful as Weiler's argument is, I believe it too warrants 
critique. As a teaching assistant and doctoral student I have lived the 
teacher-student contradiction Freire describes and would resolve through a 
recasting of these roles as teacher-student and student-teachers. As a 
student expected to write often and well, my struggle to articulate my own 
interests and commitments, to name the world meaningfully, and to 
construct authentic arguments has been a struggle primarily against 
vapidness ~ argument for argument's sake or explication for explication's 
sake. "Education is suffering from narration sickness," says Freire (1990, p. 
57). My struggle has been to try to cut through the narration to get to the 
sickness, to feel the pain, to know the proximity of death and deceit in 
order to say something that matters and to situate myself in a world of 
meaning — in other words, to break out of the fatalism Schilb sees in his 
students. 
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As a teacher expected somehow to awaken students, themselves 
prospective teachers, and to provide them with a space in which to feel the 
weight of the needless suffering of so many people as well as the yearning 
for justice, however thwarted and mocked — all within the context of trying 
to help smooth their own transition into the work of teaching — the struggle 
similarly has been against a sense of shallowness, a sense that while we 
were playing at something very important, we finally were doing no more 
than that. The effort to see myself as both teacher-student and student-
teacher, therefore, has been marked not only by the complexities and 
contradictions that, as Weiler suggests, infuse all relations of power and so 
all forms of oppression in this culture and society, but also by frustration 
with the poverty of my own language in the face of the pain and suffering I 
often can feel but not speak or speak but not feel. 
The liberation theologian/social critic Dorothee Soelle (1984) names 
the disease in calling for a "rebellion against banality" (p. 11). In a culture 
in which shopping has become a ritual many people "engage in with almost 
religious ardor," it is hardly surprising that a sense of meaninglessness 
erodes our most profound hopes and deepest desires (Soelle, 1984, p. 18). 
A popular mail-order catalog advises potential customers that "freedom of 
expression ... room for self-expression" is to be had by choosing from 
among a colorful "array of eclectic ties" and that paring "down to the 
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essentials" is a matter of "starting with just the right shirt" ~ pink silk, $88. 
Rebellion against a deadened consciousness requires naming the evils 
without. But it also entails coming to understand — understand in the 
sense of grieve — what many of us have lost of ourselves. 
All desires to be different, to become a new being, to relate 
differently to others, to communicate in a new way, have been 
exchanged for the wish to possess things. It makes a 
difference whether a person says at some point in life, "Create 
in me a clean heart, O God, and put a new and right spirit 
within me" (Ps. 51:10), or whether the yearnings that take this 
direction of radical change find no language in which to 
express themselves (Soelle, 1984, p. 15). 
This longing to become new is worlds apart from the "desire" to "fulfill 
one's potential." I believe that part of what we ~ and here I am speaking 
primarily of relatively privileged (which is to say, primarily white and 
middle-class) seekers and searchers - must rebel against is a consciousness 
of toleration, a belief that things within as well as without are somehow 
okay, and a too-easy appropriation of ideals such as love and justice that 
offer a much-needed grounding for intellectual work but do not necessarily 
evoke the longing for a new humanness. 
Freire writes out of a context in which this longing is close to the 
surface and the evils that thwart it are relatively easy to name. Radical 
educational critics in this country, however, are writing out of a context in 
which the longing for a new humanness is dissipated by the material 
comforts (or the promise thereof) that an affluent society really does 
provide those who further the interests of its most powerful citizens. 
Educational critics therefore must do more than "unveil reality." They also 
somehow must evoke an alternative consciousness in which a new 
humanness/ in the language of the dominant consciousness, is worth the 
price. 
3. How resonant is Freire's language of conversion, redemption, and 
salvation in the American context? Freire (1990) points to the tension 
inherent in the teacher-student relationship and calls for a movement 
toward equalization of power through dialogue and reconceptualization of 
what it means to teach. Nevertheless, Freire neither fully describes nor 
resolves at the theoretical level the teacher-student contradiction: He 
speaks of teacher-students and student-teachers, not simply students, 
teachers, or human beings. Similarly, Freire (1990) speaks to the process of 
conscientizacao by which the oppressed, shackled within by the internalized 
consciousness of their oppressors, can expel or exorcise that consciousness, 
but also names the paradox: "How can the oppressed, as divided, 
unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their 
liberation?" As "hosts" of their oppressors, the oppressed both desire and 
fear "authentic existence," and this is their "tragic dilemma": 
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They discover that without freedom they cannot exist 
authentically. Yet, although they desire authentic existence, 
they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves 
and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized 
(pp. 32-33). 
A third paradox ~ Freire speaks to the efficacy of critical reflection but also 
points to the essential illogic of empowerment: "[I]f the implementation of 
a liberating education requires political power and the oppressed have 
none, how then is it possible to carry out the pedagogy of the oppressed 
prior to the revolution?" (p. 39.) 
Freire (1990) does not resolve these tensions and paradoxes. Rather, 
he frames them in a language of conversion and communion. Through this 
experience (of conversion and communion) revolutionary teachers and 
leaders become radically new — other than they are ~ reborn: 
This conversion is so radical as not to allow of ambiguous 
behavior. To affirm this commitment but to consider oneself 
the proprietor of revolutionary wisdom — which must then be 
given to (or imposed on) the people — is to retain the old 
ways. The man who proclaims devotion to the cause of 
liberation yet is unable to enter into communion with the 
people, whom he continues to regard as totally ignorant, is 
grievously self-deceived.... 
Conversion to the people requires a profound rebirth. 
Those who undergo it must take on a new form of existence; 
they can no longer remain as they were (p. 47). 
Consequently, "[I]n the revolutionary process there is only one way for the 
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emerging leaders to achieve authenticity: they must 'die/ in order to be 
reborn through and with the oppressed" (p. 127). This is the path of 
salvation, which is always communal: 
[M]en cannot save themselves (no matter how one understands 
"salvation"), either as individuals or as an oppressor class. 
Salvation can be achieved only with others. To the extent, 
however, that the elites oppress, they cannot be with the 
oppressed; for being against them is the essence of oppression 
(p. 142). 
This is also the path of love: 
No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is 
commitment to their cause — the cause of liberation. And this 
commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical.... If I do not 
love the world — if I do not love life — if I do not love men — I 
cannot enter into dialogue (p. 78). 
This profound faith in the possibility of conversion and salvation through 
love and in the possibility of right relationship in an unjust social order 
shapes Freire's pedagogy. However, as critical pedagogy has developed in 
this country (and Giroux's work reflects this), Freire's language of death 
and rebirth, conversion and redemption, has been dropped, perhaps for 
good reason, in lieu of a discourse of radical democracy. This leads to the 
my last question about the application of Freirian theory to the American 
context. 
Il l  
4. How compelling is Freirian theory when extracted from a narrative 
of conversion and redemption? As Michael Harrington (1983) has argued 
so persuasively, the religious foundations of Western culture have been 
uprooted, and nothing has taken their place: 
When God and morality and religion were relativized by the 
new scientific, historical, sociological and anthropological 
consciousness of the nineteenth century, a good part of 
traditional Western culture was undermined. And when, in 
the twentieth century, it became increasingly difficult to 
believe in optimistic theories of liberal or socialist progress, the 
crisis became all the more severe (pp. 201-02). 
Consequently, "masses of people in the West [now] no longer know what 
they believe" (Harrington, 1983, p. 202). Although our society needs 
transcendental values, Harrington insists, "The basic religious tradition of 
the West can no longer, as a religious tradition, provide the core values of 
Western society" (p. 199). One wonders, therefore, how much resonance an 
explicitly religious language has in the culture at large, however powerful it 
may be for particular people. 
Harrington's (1983) response to the moral and spiritual void he 
explicates is, on one hand, openly and passionately to affirm his own 
political commitments (to democratic socialism) and, on the other, to call 
for all people of good faith, those who proclaim themselves religious and 
those who do not, to unite behind "the common enemy" — namely, the 
112 
"absence of serious thought about the human condition" (p. 203). More 
specifically, "[M]en and women of faith and anti-faith should, in the secular 
realm at least, stop fighting one another and begin to work together to 
introduce moral dimensions into economic and social debate and decision" 
(p. 218). 
Harrington is hardly alone in pleading for such honesty about the 
moral disintegration of our culture or for the broad-based coalition-building 
and energy that any significant rejuvenation will require. Among 
educational critics, David Purpel (1991) has argued repeatedly that 
"progressive social theorists committed to social transformation have not yet 
developed a compelling and sophisticated moral discourse that resonates 
with their political discourse" (p. 84). And Giroux for years has stressed the 
need for a language of hope and possibility as well as of critique. 
Moral discourse and argument for moral discourse, however, are not 
the same thing. The controlled language and careful argumentation that 
characterizes so much of the contemporary radical educational theory and 
criticism goes much further toward explication of the problem (the need for 
a compelling, resonant moral discourse that inspires and energizes) than it 
does toward filling this void. A discourse of hope that does not speak to 
the individual's yearning to become new and different ~ that is, to the 
personal, subjective, and emotional dimensions of liberation ~ remains 
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inadequate. Certainly Terry Eagleton (1983), quoted in Chapter 1, is right 
to insist that "political argument is not an alternative to moral 
preoccupations" (p. 208). In this sense to argue for a morally compelling 
discourse is always to argue for a politically resonant discourse. However, 
a discourse that speaks only or even primarily to political possibility — in a 
society in which "the political" for masses of people means little more than 
the size of their tax bill — cannot sustain the kind of radical hope needed in 
these times of pervasive cynicism and despair as well as more tangible 
oppression and exploitation. We need a critical language that enables us to 
imagine a world wholly other than the one run by the gods of fear (of 
scarcity, of inadequacy, or of implication in the poverty and misery of 
millions) and of competition (for security, for prestige, or for a sense of 
dignity, self-worth, and legitimacy). 
Giroux calls for a language of hope and possibility grounded in 
historical analysis, faith in the efficacy of critical rationality, and the 
resonance of democratic ideals. Compare this, however, with the hope 
Walter Brueggemann (1987) describes — a "resilient conviction that the 
processes of historical interaction are to be understood in relation to some 
overriding purpose that prevails in odd but uncompromising ways" (p. 3) ~ 
or with the faith that Dorothee Soelle (1984) professes: 
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We are waiting for a new heaven and a new earth, and our 
identity is located in a place where we have never yet been, in 
humanity's true home, a world without war. "O God, I am 
thine" means that I can yield myself up, but it also means that 
my life's wishes do not have to be small and fearful. They can 
be as grand as the wishes and promises of him to whom I 
belong (p. 182). 
Cornel West's (1982) broad critique of revolutionary Christianity and 
progressive Marxism helps clarify the different perspectives on hope I am 
trying to suggest: 1) hope grounded in faith in some larger-than-human 
power or purpose; and 2) political utopianism grounded in faith (solely) in 
human praxis. 
For Christians ... "what is" and ... "prevailing realities" are 
products of fallen, finite creatures, products that bear the 
stamp of imperfection. This dialectic of imperfect products 
and transformative practice, of prevailing realities and 
negation, and human depravity and human dignity, of what is 
and the not-vet constitutes the Christian dialectic of human 
nature and human history (p. 17). 
Marxism, on the other hand, 
Instead of a dialectic of human nature and human history ... 
posits a dialectic of human practice and human history: human 
nature is nothing other than human practice under specific 
historical conditions, conditions which themselves are both 
results of past human practice and preconditions for it in the 
present. This collapse of human nature into human practice 
and into human history — as opposed to a dialectical relation 
of human nature to human practice and to human history — is 
the distinctive difference between Christianity and Marxism (p. 
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19). 
Giroux's (1988b) faith is in human practice and agency — faith that through 
praxis social institutions can be changed and the conditions of human 
relations thereby transformed. This is a political project with pedagogical 
implications: 
[T]eaching for social transformation means educating students 
to take risks and to struggle within ongoing relations of power 
in order to be able to alter the grounds upon which life is 
lived. Acting as transformative intellectuals means helping 
students acquire critical knowledge about basic societal 
structures, such as the economy, the state, the workplace, and 
mass culture so that such institutions can be open to potential 
transformation. A transformation, in this case, aimed at the 
progressive humanization of the social order (p. 90). 
This project of political awareness (awareness that because social 
institutions are humanly constructed, they can be changed) is, I believe, a 
necessary but not sufficient response to the moral challenge of these times. 
The hatred and hopelessness that surrounds us all reflects, I believe, the 
lack of a broader context of meaning or of a consciousness in which people 
can understand themselves as something other than or more than actors, 
however unwitting, in a grand competition for power and wealth ~ or 
security and comfort, which amounts to the same thing. A language of 
hope and possibility grounded solely in human agency cannot speak either 
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to the yearning for redemption and wholeness or to the whole question of 
evil and enemies. Implicit in Giroux's argument is the belief that people 
can be politically awakened and rationally persuaded to commit themselves 
to the struggle for a more just social order. This, however, sidesteps the 
issue of evil and the more specific question of how educators can and 
should respond to seemingly evil people: 
Time after time we see people with strong intellectual skills, 
sophisticated education, enormous cleverness, insight, and 
understanding participate knowingly and willingly, if not 
cynically, in manipulation, oppression and deceit in all walks 
of life.... Do we really believe we can "educate" such people 
into transforming their orientation? If not, how are we to 
regard them? As enemies to be shunned if not neutralized or 
punished, or as neurotics to be treated and/or pitied and 
avoided? Can and should educators "teach" enemies and 
neurotics through a critical pedagogy? (Purpel, 1991, p. 83). 
The question I want to raise, in addition to Purpel's about whether 
some people can be educated transformatively through critical analysis and 
reflection, is to what extent we can "educate" ourselves in this way. What 
is the relationship between critical analysis and the kind of hope James 
Baldwin describes of remaining whole in a broken world, able to love in a 
world filled with hate? 
Hope — the hope that we, human beings, can be better than we 
are — dies hard; perhaps one can no longer live if one allows 
the hope to die. But it is also hard to see what one sees. One 
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sees that most human beings are wretched, and, in one way or 
another, become wicked: because they are wretched (quoted in 
Dworkin, 1987, pp. 50-51). 
Because Giroux does not speak in any direct way to the desire to become 
new and whole (redeemed) he does not evoke the anguish of living not as 
we would like to live or of being not as we would like to be. A compelling 
moral discourse must engage not only the hope for a better world for 
others but also the longing for a better way to be in the world for ourselves. 
This, of course, is not an either/or proposition. My argument has to do 
rather with emphasis: In stressing so heavily the social, institutional, and 
theoretical dimensions of hope, Giroux does not evoke the spiritual, 
emotional power of anguish and desire — what Rita Nakashima Brock 
(1988) calls the erotic power of heart: 
As we feel deeply the complex, many dimensions of ourselves, 
we begin to want the joy that we know emerges through the 
erotic.... We are empowered to refuse the convenient, shoddy, 
conventional, and safe. The erotic compels us to be hungry for 
justice at our very depths because we are response-able. We 
are able to reject what makes us numb to the suffering and 
self-hate of others. Acts against oppression become essential to 
ourselves, empowered from our energized centers. Through 
the erotic as power we become less willing to accept 
powerlessness, despair, depression, and self-denial. The erotic 
is what binds and gives life and hope (pp. 40-41). 
A compelling moral discourse requires a language that speaks to whatever 
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makes us "response-able" — certainly a language more concrete, evocative, 
and personal than that of discourses, theories, and concepts, or even of 
ethics, possibilities, and concerns. As Michael Walzer (1987) says, "'Don't 
be indifferent7 is not at all the same thing as 'Love thy neighbor as thyself " 
(p. 8). A language that urges us to uncover "sources of suffering and 
oppression" (Giroux, 1988b, p. 6) is not at all the same thing as a language 
that evokes remorse and kindles the desire to become better, whole, more 
loving and caring. We need a language of desire for renewal and 
redemption as well as a theoretical framework that helps us situate this 
desire, and all that thwarts it, in a social, political, and intellectual context. 
Giroux (1988b) attempts to do this in appropriating aspects of 
different traditions, including feminist theory and liberation theology, to 
forge a moral framework supportive of an educational theory centered on a 
critical view of citizenship. Giroux cites the work of, among others, 
feminist theologians Beverly Harrison, Sharon Welch, and Rebecca Chopp 
and applauds their efforts to ground a knowledge of justice and liberation 
in experience and concrete struggle: 
One of the most important insights developing within this 
work focuses on the experiences of women and the oppressed 
as the source of knowledge and moral principles. In this view, 
justice is bound less to abstract, conceptual rules and tied more 
closely to concrete forms of struggle and liberation that give 
priority to the well-being of people in their own historical 
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locations. Justice in this perspective is not merely the 
application of procedural rules to varying contexts; it is an 
attempt to understand how moral sensibilities are formed amid 
human suffering and the struggle for liberation and freedom 
(p. 93). 
What gets lost in Giroux's appropriation of liberation theology, however, is 
precisely the God talk. There is, for example, no mention of Jesus of 
Nazareth in Giroux's sorting and selecting from among the insights of 
liberation theology and so no embodiment of the flesh-and-blood promise 
of redemption and the radical hope of newness. 
Giroux (1988b) bears witness to the difficulty of trying to appropriate 
Freire's political ideals in the absence of a religious language that 
substantiates hope. Giroux drops the language of conversion and 
redemption and appeals instead to the ideals of radical democracy, then 
calls for a compelling moral discourse, which he arguably fails to use — 
because, as he understands so well, we don't have one. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, Giroux's argument for moral discourse leads to discussion of the 
legitimacy of critical authority. Giroux begins with the assertion that the 
idea of democracy "cannot be grounded in some ahistorical, transcendent 
notion of truth or authority," but rather must be seen itself as "a 'site' of 
struggle and as a social practice ... informed by competing ideological 
conceptions of power, politics, and community" (pp. 22, 29). However, in 
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the absence of "a transcendent guarantor," critical authority becomes an 
ongoing struggle wherein the battle over meaning amounts, to put it most 
harshly, to a competition for credibility. From this perspective, Giroux is 
arguing for the need to enlist moral resonance as well as rational 
persuasiveness in the struggle to establish and legitimate critical authority. 
Giroux in one sense does as Harrington, and Walzer, would have 
him do in not using a religious language of conversion and communion. 
Good criticism is always written in the language "of the folk," Walzer (1988) 
says: "The best critics simply take hold of that language and raise it to a 
new pitch of intensity and argumentative power — like Luther in his 
pamphlets or Marx in The Communist Manifesto" (p. 9). Although 
Giroux's language is hardly that of "the folk," he does appeal to the ideals 
of a broadly shared democratic tradition and in this sense grounds his 
critique in presumably common moral references. However, when ideals 
and hopes are expressed in an almost exclusively political language, there is 
then no way to speak convincingly about the possibility of transformation, 
personal or social. Freire (1990) presumes the possibility of resolving "the 
contradiction" between teachers and students or oppressors and oppressed 
as each "becomes new" and these distinctions therefore become 
meaningless. He explains: 
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Liberation is ... a childbirth, and a painful one. The man who 
emerges is a new man, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed 
contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all men. 
Or to put it another way, the solution of this contradiction is 
born in the labor which brings into the world this new man: no 
longer oppressor nor longer oppressed, but man in the process 
of achieving freedom (pp. 33-34). 
This image of a world of "new men" seems a long way from Giroux's 
(1988b) "vision of the future grounded in a programmatic language of civic 
responsibility and public good" (p. 31). 
Without a way to talk convincingly about transformative possibility, 
issues of power, and so of authority, remain paramount. In a world in 
which evil persists and the existence of enemies is taken for granted, who 
has power and authority becomes the overriding, all-important question. 
Consequently, the question of how people, institutions, and theories can 
obtain and maintain this power and authority ~ in other words, what 
legitimates power and authority ~ arises. Giroux (1988b) speaks to this 
question in rejecting universal truths, ahistorical foundational principles, 
and professional standards of methodological rigor as criteria for valuing 
educational criticism and theory. Rather, he says, legitimacy should be seen 
as a function of emancipatory potential. 
[Clritical theory in its first instance should be valued for its 
political project, its estranging quality, and the nature of its 
criticism as a part of a project of democratic possibility and 
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hope. In other words, it should be valued for the extent to 
which it can provide potentially liberating forms of critique 
and the theoretical basis for new forms of social relations (p. 
205). 
Without such a "standard" of valuation (emancipatory potential) radical 
educational theory, like the radical social theory from which it draws, falls 
prey to what Giroux calls "an ever-deepening quagmire of theoretical 
obfuscations" and to the temptation to "redefine social crises in purely 
technical and academic terms" (p. 204). Without transcendental values or 
universal foundational principles with which to discredit opponents, critics 
end up battling out not only what "democracy" or "liberation" will mean, 
but also what will count as legitimate authority to participate in the 
"conversation" about these things. Consequently, in a culture obsessed with 
competition and hierarchy, the struggle over language becomes a struggle 
to win personal legitimacy, a struggle that presupposes that some are not 
legitimate. Giroux's own critique of the concept of authority is instructive. 
As part of his larger project of developing a rationale for a politics 
and pedagogy of critical citizenship, Giroux (1988b) critiques popular 
understandings of authority: 
Conservatives celebrate authority, linking it to popular 
expressions of everyday life, but in doing so they express and 
support reactionary and undemocratic interests. On the other 
hand, radical educators tend to equate authority with forms of 
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domination or the loss of freedom and consequently fail to 
develop a conceptual category for constructing a programmatic 
language of hope and struggle.... Liberals, in general, provide 
the most dialectical view of authority but fail to apply it in a 
concrete way so as to interrogate the dynamics of domination 
and freedom as they are expressed within the asymmetrical 
relations of power and privilege that characterize various 
aspects of school life (pp. 78-79). 
In other words, while the Right valorizes authority but in destructive ways, 
the Left tends to equate authority with domination, with politically 
disastrous consequences. Meanwhile, middle-of-the-road liberals have 
neutralized and sanitized their basically good ideas about authority by 
ignoring issues of social and political context. Against all these views of 
authority, Giroux delineates a concept of emancipatory authority, which he 
believes holds together the political and the pedagogical by legitimating 
intellectual struggle (in and outside the classroom) grounded in democratic 
ideals. His is 
a view of authority and ethics that defines schools as part of an 
ongoing movement and struggle for democracy and teachers as 
intellectuals who both legitimate and introduce students to a 
particular way of life (p. 72). 
This view of authority "legitimates schools as democratic, public spheres"; it 
legitimates "teachers as transformative intellectuals who work toward a 
realization of their views of community, social justice, empowerment, and 
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social reform"; and it legitimates the work of "rethinking the purpose and 
meaning of public education and critical pedagogy" (pp. 72-73, 88). This 
last point is important. In legitimating particular kinds of intellectual work, 
the concept of emancipatory authority legitimates particular kinds of 
intellectuals — specifically, transformative intellectuals who function "as 
producers of cultural forms and discourses that point to particular views of 
authority, ethics, and pedagogical practice whose underlying logic is 
consistent with a radical cultural politics" (pp. 87-88). 
My point in trying to clarify Giroux's project is to suggest its 
justificatory dimension. Giroux would provide theoretical justification for 
intellectuals engaged in a particular kind of important work. He provides 
the theoretical tools, including reconstructed notions of citizenship and 
authority, for justifying a political and pedagogical project of democratic 
renewal. However, while Giroux calls into question narrow notions of 
legitimation, such as those based on "the deadening criteria of consistency 
and reliability," he does not question the whole idea that one's authority 
must be legitimated (p. 205). That is, he does not question the socially 
constructed need to legitimate oneself in a world in which it is taken for 
granted that some are not legitimate. 
Giroux in one sense responds to Dwayne Huebner's (1975) decades-
old but still relevant challenge to educators to avow their own moral and 
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political commitments: 
Why do we move around so frantically?... Why do we not 
comport ourselves in such a manner that our center — our 
sense of who we are and what we are about — can be restored 
and reformed? Why do we not pause to feel the painful 
tensions and pulls in us, which are reflections of the tensions 
and pulls of our society?... Is it because we are afraid to 
acknowledge that power makes up our center ~ a power that 
necessarily comes up against the power of others: principals, 
parents, kids, board members, text writers (pp. 271-72). 
Giroux, to his credit, has made the workings of power and his own political 
commitments the center of his considerable writings ~ and in so doing has 
made a major contribution to educational criticism. In this way Giroux has 
responded to the challenge to understand "what we are about" and to 
recognize the political dimensions of his educational work. However, 
because the challenge Huebner articulates is itself so important, I want to 
look carefully at the nature of Giroux's response. 
If Huebner is right that the process of reclaiming our centers is 
critical to educational possibility (leaving aside the important question of in 
what sense such things as "centers" exist), Giroux's work takes on 
heightened significance. Giroux not only responds to the challenge to 
affirm moral and political ideals but also demonstrates a methodology for 
doing so: Theoretical justification of one's commitments is, he suggests, if 
not wholly sufficient, certainly necessary and fundamental. Because radical 
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educators have not had a well-developed moral theory, they have not had 
"a theoretical discourse and set of categories" with which to construct 
"forms of knowledge, classroom social relations, and visions of the future 
that give substance to the meaning of critical pedagogy." Consequently, the 
radical position has been almost entirely cut out of "the debate on 
schooling, politics, and values that has been gaining force in the United 
States" (Giroux, 1988b, pp. 37-38). 
Giroux (1988b) speaks to the need to elaborate the moral theory he 
sees as a necessary but missing or inadequately developed in radical 
educational discourse, and in this way makes an important contribution to 
radical educational theory and criticism. As I have suggested, however, 
this project is not problem-free. Because Giroux's effort to articulate what 
does and does not count as emancipatory authority is simultaneously an 
argument about who is and is not a truly transformative intellectual 
Giroux's project raises questions about community - specifically, about the 
tension between 1) strengthening an existing community (such as that of 
transformative intellectuals) through a process of self-definition and 2) 
enlarging the boundaries of a community through a certain suspension or 
alteration of pre-existing definitions. My question is: When does a 
heightened sensitivity to who "we" are begin to produce a "they" we then 
must oppose? And, what is gained and what lost in such a process? 
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These questions arise for me primarily out of my experience in a 
project, literally, of authorization — of giving authority. As a member of a 
two-year publishing collective for a journal written by and for Quaker 
women, I participated in the difficult decisions of what to publish and not 
publish — that is, whom to provide a forum and so whom to deny a forum 
~ in an explicitly moral and spiritual context. We took as fundamental to 
our project Quaker teachings and traditions as well as the significance and 
importance of women's voices. Most of the journal's authors had never 
published their work, so editorial decisions literally were about whom to 
make (and not make) an author. Reflecting on the meaning of authority in 
that context and the moral issues it raised has given me a critical 
perspective on Giroux's effort to define authority in an emancipatory way. 
Among the lessons I learned working on the journal is that trying to 
derive editorial standards from a religious tradition is certainly preferable 
to trying to derive them from the workings of the marketplace, but 
nevertheless is difficult and never clear-cut. At the simplest level, we 
struggled to reach any consensus (a method of decision-making central to 
Quaker practice) about what falls under the banner of "Quaker women" — 
anything written by Quakers? by women? about Quakers? about women? 
in harmony with Quaker teachings? in harmony with feminist 
commitments, which we assumed we shared but soon found out we really 
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didn't? I bring this up in connection with Giroux because I believe that 
trying to describe or prescribe a pedagogy for democracy or emancipation 
is no less fraught with definitional tension and uncertainty than trying to 
derive editorial standards from the values of Quakers and/or women. 
Giroux, at least in Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life, goes to 
great lengths to refine the particular meanings he wants to ascribe to such 
terms as citizenship and authority, and in the process clarifies what 
democracy means for him. However, he doesn't deal with what I suspect 
are the almost inevitable outcomes of such a process of refining and 
critiquing. Working on the journal, I saw that editorial decisions both 
strengthened and at times threatened the community. Decisions about 
what submissions to publish or reject were always statements about what 
spiritual, political, or aesthetic values we could affirm as a group 
composed, for the most part, of fairly conservative Quaker women. 
Because we shared a commitment to decision-making through consensus 
and because the health of the community (the broader readership as well as 
the publishing collective) was as important to us as the quality of the 
journal, tensions arose — tensions that trying to further clarify our editorial 
standards only exacerbated. 
Particularly difficult, for example, was a poem celebrating lesbianism. 
Some members of the collective (generally the younger women) were 
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delighted: We had not dealt adequately at all with issues of sensuality and 
sexuality and publishing the poem would enable us to express our own 
concerns and commitments. However, other members (generally the older 
women) were opposed to publishing the poem - for much the same 
reasons. What would publication suggest about themselves? Sensing that 
really wrestling with the inter-group conflicts this poem had brought to the 
surface would threaten the community, we talked around the issue: After 
hours of evasive discussion, someone pointed that, all other considerations 
aside, the poem was simply not very good. That we all could agree on and 
so rejected the poem. In one sense, we took refuge in aesthetic criteria in 
order to avoid dealing with issues of sexuality and politics that we should 
have named and struggled with. In another sense, however, we opted to 
preserve the community (which our pseudo-concern with aesthetic 
standards allowed us to do) rather than sacrifice it to individuals' desires to 
have the journal reflect their own deeply felt, but nevertheless personal, 
political perspectives and levels of comfort with issues of sexuality. My 
point is that we were able to keep the group together and get the work 
done (publish reasonably on time) only because we tolerated a certain 
amount of ambiguity about who we were as a group. 
Thinking about Giroux's project in this context raises for me the 
question of what is at stake in seeing legitimation as the outcome of a 
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process of justification, the point of which is to defend adequately one's 
own intellectual commitments and so too the political and pedagogical 
practices they imply. I raise this question in light of some of the insights of 
the object-relations theory developed by Nancy Chodorow (1985), among 
others — specifically, insights about our ontological relationality: 
Object-relations theory shows that in the development of the 
self the primary task is not the development of ego boundaries 
and a body ego. Along with the earliest development of its 
sense of separateness, the infant constructs an internal set of 
unconscious, affectively loaded representations of others in 
relation to its self, and an internal sense of self in relationship 
emerges.... This suggests that the central core of self is 
internally, a relational ego, a sense of self-in-good-relationship 
(pp. 9-10). 
This understanding of "the central core of self1 suggests that, as Rita 
Nakashima Brock (1988) puts it, 
We are fundamentally relationship-seeking beings. We 
internalize most deeply and powerfully our earliest 
relationships, from which come our ability or inability to 
internalize later loves and losses, to coexist humanely with 
others, and to continue to flourish and grow as persons.... We 
begin with an understanding that we are intimately connected, 
constituted by our relationships ontologically, that is, as a basic 
unavoidable principle of existence (pp. 5, 7). 
This view of the self calls into question the whole project of trying to 
legitimate our beliefs and commitments through theoretical justification. At 
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the very least, coming to see ourselves as legitimate would be a much more 
embodied, emotional, and interpersonal process than Giroux suggests. 
Reading Giroux against Chodorow and Brock raises another question 
for me: If legitimating beliefs and commitments requires defending them, 
who or what are they to be defended against? This is the question, as I 
said earlier, of enemies. Giroux would establish the legitimacy of his 
understandings of authority and citizenship over and against other, less 
critical and less democratically oriented understandings. But where does 
this leave us? If Giroux "wins," who loses? As David Purpel (personal 
communication, 1992) often asks, "Who is the Leffs Other?" If Giroux's 
(and my own) commitments attain legitimacy, whose commitments are 
then, by definition, not legitimate - which is to say who is then, by 
definition, not legitimate? Is the fundamental issue how best to establish 
the legitimacy of particular ideals and commitments or how best to 
transform a culture that makes legitimacy a competition among competing 
interests rather than a relational power we afford each other? 
In fairness, Giroux (1988b) does name, if not the enemy, what he is 
speaking against. The model of legitimation he rejects is professionalism: 
"As it stands, teachers tend to legitimate their roles as professionals through 
highly exclusionary and undemocratic appeals to knowledge and 
expertise" ~ which, of course, "has little to do with democracy as a social 
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movement" (p. 109). Giroux's point is well taken. Trivializing, competitive, 
and hierarchical notions of legitimized authority clearly are not what we 
need. But so too are there problems with Giroux's perspective. To go back 
to Huebner (1975), his caution against affirming ourselves as functionaries 
in the world we call school is important: "Why are we lost?" he asks 
educators and speculates: 
I think it is because we have let the school become our center and we 
have become an appendage, nothing but a role or functionary in 
someone else's institution.... If we forget or never knew that schools 
are a product of men and women who used their power to build or 
maintain a certain kind of public world, then we easily become 
bondsmen of those who live only in the routines. We do their things, 
maintain their world, distribute their awards (p. 272). 
Implicit in Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life is a call to affirm 
ourselves not as functionaries in someone else's institution but rather as 
transformative intellectuals engaged in politically oppositional struggle ~ 
struggle, however, that includes the need to justify our commitments and in 
this way to legitimate our own authority as democratically oriented 
teachers, scholars, and critics. 
My question, therefore, is how radical Giroux's alternative to 
professionalism as a legitimating ground of authority is. Until and unless 
the legitimation of some does not come at the expense of the illegitimation 
of others (a trade-off Giroux's notion of transformative intellectuals 
133 
implies4), we have only redefined the arena of competition for personal 
dignity and a sense of self-worth and altered the rules by which the 
winners and losers will be declared. Giroux, as: Patrick Shannon (1988) 
says, offers radical intellectuals engaged in political and pedagogical 
struggle "words to live by and to work with" (p. 133). He offers the 
sustenance of intellectual justification for politically oppositional struggle 
and the shoring up of community that efforts toward self-definition 
provide. What Giroux doesn't provide — and this we sorely need ~ is 
critique of the way in which the culture makes self- and community-
definition a process of self- and community-justification on the basis of a 
notion of legitimacy that is never assured and always something to be 




EDUCATIONAL CRITICISM AND IMPLICATION 
This dissertation reflects my exploration of some of the difficulties 
and complexities inherent in the work of educational criticism through 
critique of my own practice — an approach that led me to questions of 
accountability and critical authority. Chapter 1 argues that as a form of 
social and cultural criticism educational criticism shares in all the 
difficulties of the broader practice — including the questions Jacoby raises 
about the academization of criticism and the questions Ehrenreich raises 
about what she sees as a consciousness of elitism on the part of the 
professional middle class. With the academization of criticism has come a 
notion of accountability related more to a sense of the critic's moral 
autonomy — what Jacoby (1987) calls "the freedom to be academic" (p. 189) 
and what an even angrier Steven Watts (1992) calls "academic narcissism" in 
which "the stakes are almost exclusively academic: reputation, promotion, 
and publication" (p. A40) — than to a sense of responsibility grounded in 
relationships with real people. 
Chapter 2 focuses on two of the most influential texts in educational 
criticism: the NCEE's A Nation at Risk and Allan Bloom's The Closing of 
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the American Mind. These rhetorically powerful texts, I argued, have been 
countered with moral critiques of their anti-egalitarian premises and 
implications. However, these moral critiques (at least in the case of 
Nussbaum's and Aronowitz and Giroux's of Bloom) are buttressed by 
arguments along methodological lines — leading to complaints, for example, 
about poor scholarship, sloppy thinking, or myopic analysis. Such a critical 
strategy, it now seems to me, reflects uncertainty on the part of the critic 
about the role of moral argument in scholarly criticism — an uncertainty 
reflected, in turn, in the questions Giroux raises explicitly about critical 
authority. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, education as a field of inquiry has not 
escaped the radical questioning of postmodernism that has swept across the 
humanities and the social sciences. Neither, therefore, can the practice of 
educational criticism escape scrutiny of its purposes nor educational critics 
escape scrutiny of the grounds of their authority. If what educational critics 
are about is not primarily explication of the how-to's of schooling but 
rather broad social and cultural critique, in what can and should their 
authority as critics be grounded? 
Walzer's (1988) thoughts about social criticism help clarify why 
trying to ground critical authority methodologically is so difficult. Most 
fundamentally, Walzer says, social criticism is complaint about the 
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circumstances of our shared life: 
Complaint is one of the elementary forms of self-assertion, and 
the response to complaint is one of the elementary forms of 
mutual recognition. When what is at issue is not existence 
itself but social existence, being-for-others, then complaint is 
proof enough: I complain, therefore I am. We discuss the 
complaint, therefore we are (p. 3). 
Given this interpretation of social criticism, why should anyone pay 
particular attention to someone's thoughts on this subject — the 
circumstances of our common life ~ if their primary qualification is a 
generic adeptness at showing up the methodological flaws of other people's 
arguments? In some sense, this is a straw man. I set it up, however, to 
suggest the way in which methodological critique too often tries to stand in 
for powerful and persuasive moral vision — but finally can't. 
The educational/social criticism of Kozol is a case in point. I, along 
with many others (Kozol's most recent book, Savage Inequalities, made the 
bestseller list), listen to him less because I appreciate his methdological 
rigor than because he evokes the desire for a better world in which children 
do not suffer so much. Those critics who argue that Kozol's methodology 
leaves something to be desired are probably right (Jeffrey Kane, personal 
communication, 1992). Conceding this, however, does not change my 
evaluation of his work. Kozol's authority as a critic is grounded 
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elsewhere — in, I would argue, his relationship with the children he writes 
about with such compassion and indignation. 
Chapter 3, focused on Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed and 
Henry Giroux's Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life, raises further 
questions about critical authority. Freire and Giroux, like other critics 
writing in the tradition of critical pedagogy, do, to their credit, boldly 
affirm the moral underpinnings of their work and attempt to ground their 
authority therein. In critiquing the Freire and Giroux texts, however, I 
came to see how affirmation of transformative possibility (the core of 
Giroux's work), when disconnected from a persuasive language of such 
possibility (the language of redemption and conversion Freire uses, for 
example), leaves unchallenged the significance of the political question of 
who should have more power than whom. This question is important. 
Who has power over whom matters tremendously. However, the struggle 
to gain and then maintain power and authority will (indeed, in one sense, 
must) require our total attention until and unless we can, in good faith, ask 
other questions — such as how we can best use the shared power we no 
longer have any desire to hoard and protect. 
It is in this context that I raised questions about Giroux's notion of 
emancipatory authority — a way of thinking about authority, I suggested, 
that remains trapped in a consciousness of struggling to win and keep a 
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certain power. Further, as I argued in Chapter 3, the very language of 
legitimacy Giroux uses to talk about issues of authority reinforces a 
consciousness of competition and triumphalism — over those whose 
"illegitimacy" is exposed as one's own is established. Although I share with 
Giroux the belief that power in its many guises (including critical authority) 
must be attended to, I know just as surely that we cannot compete our way 
into a consciousness of cooperation and sharing. 
Perhaps more than any other educational critic or theorist, Giroux 
-has wrestled with the problem of how to ground critical authority in these 
times of skepticism about all foundationalism and "universal" truths. If 
there is nothing either foundational or enduring to back us up, how can we 
claim what we say is right, even as we know it is? Along the lines of 
Purpel's (1989) argument that true enough is good enough for our purposes 
here on earth, right enough seems also to be an adequate justification. Still, 
this doesn't solve the problem I believe often lies behind the skeptic's 
question of how to ground critical authority in a foundationless world — the 
problem, partly one of rhetoric but not wholly so, of moral argumentation 
(how to do it). 
Giroux (1988b) would "shore up" his critical authority by aligning it 
with democratic ideals and with an elaborated moral theory ~ subjected, he 
suggests, to the "truth test" of emancipatory potential. He acknowledges a 
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debt to the feminist liberation theologian Sharon Welch, whose politics, he 
says, are 
firmly rooted in a view of authority that is not dependent 
merely on the logic of epistemological arguments, but which is 
deeply forged in "a creation of a politics of truth that defines 
the true as that which liberates and furthers specific processes 
of liberation" (Welch, 1985, quoted in Giroux, p. 98). 
West (1988) critiques Welch on this point and argues that such a view of 
truth ("that which liberates") is too abstract — a criticism I believe applies to 
Giroux's project as well: 
[H]her theology [is] too thin, her faith too fragile, and her 
sense of struggle too abstract.... A faith based solely on 
contemporary struggle for liberation is too presentist and 
unmindful of unpredictable future developments. And a sense 
of struggle that focuses more on the improbability of ultimate 
triumph than on the necessity and possibility of gaining the 
next penultimate victory reflects a distance from practical 
engagement that can never disarm skepticism (West, 1988, pp. 
210-11). 
Although I do not see in Giroux's work the overemphasis on "the 
improbability of ultimate triumph" that West sees in Welch's, I believe 
Giroux, like Welch, has difficulty grounding his ideals in day-to-day 
practical struggle because his hopes are Utopian and not reformist ~ as well 
they should be. But this needs to be acknowledged. 
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Giroux's thought, to me, reflects what seems like the tragic struggle 
of the radical intellectual committed to a praxis in which he seems not 
wholly to believe ~ given his insightfulness about what all really is wrong 
in the world. The struggle Giroux's work represents and reflects is 
important and there is perhaps no other educational critic who has wrestled 
so thoroughly and systematically with these existential questions as Giroux. 
But we (and here I align myself those I criticize) have not "solved" the 
problem of how to sustain hope in a world that disgusts us. As a "truth 
test," "emancipatory possibility" ~ or, to use Welch's language, the question, 
Does it liberate? — is at once too amorphous and too stringent for any of 
our theories to pass. 
This leads to another concern I have with Giroux's way of thinking 
about critical authority, which is that it seems more firmly grounded in 
ideals (of radical democracy) than in relationships with real people and the 
responsibility those relationships entail. What is the connection, I wonder, 
between 1) those people whose hopes and fears find expression (or don't) 
in the language or radical democracy and emancipation and 2) the critic 
who espouses the ideals? I am trying to suggest not that affirmation of 
ideals is unimportant, but rather that ideals, when clung to, can all but 
eclipse the flesh-and-blood anguish and desire with which those ideals 
presumably resonate. 
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These concerns have led me to try to think differently about issues of 
authority and accountability. Heyward's (1989) thoughts along these lines 
are helpful. She grounds her work (the development of a theology of 
sexuality) in a relational, communitarian ethic of accountability: 
My people hold me accountable — responsible for what I say. 
And there is nothing abstract about "my people": They are my 
students and my teachers, my friends and lovers, my 
companeras and colleagues. They have names, faces, 
commitments, values, problems, questions, feelings, and ideas. 
With me and with one another, these people are healers, 
teachers, priests, pastors, counselors, therapists, organizers, 
politicians, poets, artists, mothers, fathers, daughters, and 
sons.... There [also] are many in whose service I hope to be 
working whom I do not now (and never will) know ~ a vast 
number of people, especially women, throughout this and 
every nation whose bodyselves have been split asunder by 
structures of sexual and gender injustice. I attempt to hold 
myself accountable to these people whose lives I personally do 
not know and cannot well imagine (pp. 7-8). 
Such a relational notion of accountability and authority goes a long way 
toward bringing ideals back to earth. 
However, as insightful as I think Heyward is about authority and 
accountability, her ideas are not problem-free. Despite her desire to remain 
accountable to some whose lives she "cannot well imagine," her sphere of 
accountability seems essentially to be composed of like-minded friends. My 
difficulty with this comes in trying to generalize such an ethic. What of 
multinational corporations? Do we want them to be accountable (as they 
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now are) essentially to no one but their "friends"? I don't. The ethic 
Heyward affirms (in the sense that she doesn't challenge it) is, in one sense, 
the problem Jacoby rails against in criticizing academic critics. To the 
extent that "the community of scholars" means faculty tenured at major 
universities, in what sense does a communitarian ethic of accountability 
challenge a problematic professionalism? 
I have a second question about Heyward's basically very good ideas 
about the communal, relational basis of accountability: What does it mean 
for people like me who have little idea of what, if any, community they 
belong to? With the promise of a one-year instructorship or assistant 
professorship in hand, am I now a bona fide member of the "community of 
scholars" or only a marginal affiliate, a migrant tagalong? Similarly, as 
someone who reads and tries to write radical criticism, do I belong to one 
of the "communities of resistance and solidarity" with which real radical 
scholars identify? And if not, why not? What does membership require or 
entail? I feel perhaps the strongest bond with other single mothers. At the 
same time I know my life, haunted as it is by texts and more texts (texts my 
nine-year-old daughter delights in ridiculing), differs radically from the 
lives of most other single mothers. And what of my white, suburban, 
middle-class roots? Neither ideologically (too radical or at least politically 
marginal) nor economically (too poor) would I qualify any longer as a 
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member of that great community of the mainstream middle-class. At the 
same time, I continue to realize, often with dismay, how deeply I have 
internalized mainstream, middle-class norms and habits of thought. That is 
who I am, even as I try to piece and patch together some alternative 
community to join. 
Aside from the question of what the multiple alignments and 
allegiances of people like me mean for a consciousness of community, there 
also is the question raised in Chapter 3 of the tension between the work of 
criticism, which entails moral judgment, and the work of building and 
sustaining community, which requires a great deal of tolerance, forgiveness, 
and willingness simply to look the other way. To judge is to draw lines 
between right and wrong, the sacred and the profane, the just and the 
unjust. And these lines almost always end up separating the good people 
from the bad, friends from enemies, or those worthy of respect from those 
deserving of scorn — in short, "them" from "us," which, of course, is never 
helpful in the work of enlarging community. This is a paradox I cannot 
begin to resolve. We must name and condemn the profane, the evil, and 
the unjust and we must transcend a consciousness of allies and enemies — 
which is to say, I suppose, that we must live with the moral ambiguity and 
in the tension it reflects. 
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The subjective dimension of this tension is perhaps the fear of 
isolation bell hooks (1991) writes about with respect to the work of black 
women intellectuals: 
Black women struggling to strengthen and deepen our 
commitment to intellectual work know that we must confront 
the issue of "isolation," our fear of it, our fear that it estranges 
us from community inhibits full pursuit of intellectual work. 
Within patriarchy, men have always had the freedom to isolate 
themselves from family and community, to do autonomous 
work and re-enter a relational world when they chose, 
irrespective of their class status.... [However,] before that 
isolated Black woman intellectual can re-enter a relational 
community, it is likely that she must first assume responsibility 
for a variety of household chores (pp. 158-59). 
I believe there is another dimension to this fear, one that is perhaps more 
significant for white women, particularly middle-class white women, than 
for black women for whom radical protest historically has been more of a 
necessity. I know my own fear is that my now fairly well developed 
critical consciousness will provoke anger and hostility from the very people 
I care most about. My fear is of transgressing boundaries of trust by 
bringing my well honed capacities to judge and critique too close to home, 
and so of stepping over some highly consequential line I would see only 
after crossing it. From this perspective, I would ask Jacoby to have more 
compassion for the academics he chastises for their concerns with 
upholding institutional standards of professionalism. Situated as scholars 
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are in hierarchical institutions — "affiliation" with which is highly 
competitive and "disaffiliation" with which makes the work of criticism 
enormously more difficult ~ there would seem to be something to be said 
for choosing one's battles. 
In sum, as complicated and problematic as Heyward's 
communitarian ethic of accountability is, I don't want to lose the central 
insight her understanding reflects: that we are relationally-constituted 
beings who deny that ontology at our own peril. Our theories of authority 
and accountability, I believe, have to begin here, with who we are in 
relation to each other. 
This brings me to Elizabeth Spelman (1991), who has shown me the 
way in which the emotions I have perceived as being so intrusive, so much 
in the way of my own work, are in one sense the very substance of that 
work. Emotions, particularly what Spelman calls moral emotions, reflect 
the ties we feel with others: 
Our emotions, or at least some of them, can be highly 
revelatory of whom and what we care or don't care about. 
They provide powerful clues to the ways in which we take 
ourselves to be implicated in the lives of others and they in 
ours (p. 220). 
Different emotions "imply different notions of responsibility and depth of 
concern" (p. 221). Emotions, therefore, are best understood not as internal 
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events ~ "churnings in our stomachs, flutterings in our hearts, chokings in 
our throat" — but rather "as deeply connected to ourselves as moral agents" 
(pp. 221, 222). Attending to our emotions, therefore, should tell us 
something about our sense of moral agency. 
Spelman offers these examples: If I regret that something has 
happened, I probably regard the event as undesirable, but do not 
necessarily feel any personal responsibility for it. For example, I may regret 
that my theories do not explain more adequately the injustice I try to 
analyze, but nevertheless feel no particular implication in or responsibility 
for. Embarrassment suggests a stronger sense of implication. The concern 
here, however, is less about what has happened or about my own behavior 
than about the fact of exposure. Others may have seen or discovered 
something I wish they had not, but this in itself does not suggest I have 
failed to act in accord with my own moral standards. A sense of guilt. 
however, implies that I have failed to live up to such standards — those I 
either had set for myself or accepted from some authority. Still, guilt does 
not necessarily imply there is anything wrong with me. I did something I 
probably should not have done, but my moral being is otherwise okay and 
not irrevocably damaged by this one slip-up. Shame, however, brings me 
face-to-face with the realization that I am not the person I thought I was or 
hoped I was. In shame, I realize I have done something I should not have 
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done and that this behavior is in fact not inconsistent with who I am. 
Spelman's discussion of the different senses of responsibility implied 
by these emotions (regret, embarrassment, guilt, and shame) suggests a way 
of gaining a perspective, if not on what the relationship among critic, 
subject, and audience ought to be, at least on the different shapes in which 
it comes. Attending to the emotional tone of criticism should tell us 
something about the nature of the responsibility the critic feels in 
connection with those she writes for and, perhaps especially, about. 
Attending to emotional tone, that is, should tell us something about the 
degree of implication and self-implication critics feel in the worlds they 
critique. Consider, for example, these passages ~ three examples of 
educational criticism in the sense that they are about people learning things 
and in the sense that they imply some judgment about what appears to 
have been learned: 
Example 1 
In one of my recent graduate courses I asked a number of 
public school teachers what criteria they used to defend or 
reject the introduction of certain materials either into their 
curricula or as part of a classroom discussion. In general, most 
of the teachers in the class answered that if people in the 
community or on the school board wanted the material 
included in the curriculum it should be there. Others argued 
that the knowledge selected should be judged on the basis of 
whether it contributed either to the development of an 
"academic" discipline or to the students' intellectual growth. In 
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both cases, there was no attempt to defend what was to be 
taught in wider political and ethical terms (Giroux, 1988b, p. 
107). 
Example 2 
I had begun to teach in 1964 in Boston in a segregated school 
so crowded and so poor that it could not provide my fourth 
grade children with a classroom. We shared an auditorium 
with another fourth grade and the choir and a group that was 
rehearsing, starting in October, for a Christmas play that, 
somehow, never was produced. In the spring I was shifted to 
another fourth grade that had had a string of substitutes all 
year. The 35 children in the class hadn't had a permanent 
teacher since they entered kindergarten. That year, I was their 
thirteenth teacher. 
The results were seen in the first tests I gave. In April, 
most were reading at the second grade level. Their math 
ability was at the first grade level. 
In an effort to resuscitate their interest, I began to read 
them poetry I liked. They were drawn especially to poems of 
Robert Frost and Langston Hughes. One of the most 
embittered children in the class began to cry when she first 
heard the words of Langston Hughes. 
What happens to a dream deferred? 
Does it dry up 
like a raisin in the sun? 
She went home and memorized the lines. 
The next day, I was fired (Kozol, 1991, pp. 1-2). 
Example 3 
Late one evening, I was walking down an isolated street in 
Manhattan. A beggar was squatting on a pile of rags, and I 
was afraid of the old black man. As I gave him some money, 
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he looked at me and said, clearly and with great dignity, "God 
bless you." I was moved, but I was not quite sure why. 
Today I would say that God's pain was visible in the old 
man's pain. Insofar as I took part in it, my own pain was 
transformed: my fear left me. My rage returned. Everything 
that Paul told the Corinthians about the sorrow that comes 
from God was present in that experience: I was outraged and 
horrified over this everyday picture of street life. "You have 
engaged in resistance, you have longed for a change and have 
called the guilty to account" (2 Cor. 7:11, Jorg Zink).... The old 
man who has no shelter in the richest country on earth, the 
richest country in history, evangelizes me; he calls forth my 
pain for his country, which I love and despise (Soelle, 1989, p. 
330). 
What is going on in these passages? The first one, I suggest, reflects 
anger in the face of what the author goes on to describe as oppressive 
"ideologies and practices" to which the students appear vulnerable, and 
perhaps regret that the students are not more aware of and thoughtful 
about the political and ethical dimensions of their work. There is, however, 
no embarrassment or guilt — no sense that the critic himself has done 
wrong or is morally implicated in the student's lack of understanding or 
vulnerability. The exchange between teacher and student, according to the 
author's own interpretation, tells us about them (the students), not him (the 
teacher-critic): 
The answers ... suggest a lack of theoretical depth and civic 
rigor on the part of these teachers.... [T]hey [also] indicate how 
vulnerable teachers might be to educational ideologies and 
practices that reduce them to merely carrying out the "orders" 
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of wider interest groups (Giroux, 1988b, p. 107). 
The second passage, to me, reflects outrage in the face of racism and 
the pain and injustice it causes, as well as affection for the children, 
depicted as innocent victims. The teacher appears to be "on the side" of the 
children and even to identify with them. He shares with them the poetry 
he loves and, like them, is treated unjustly: He is fired from his job. The 
critic here is emotionally connected with his criticism through his own 
indignation and compassion. Again, however, there is no suggestion that 
the critic feels morally implicated in the injustice he shows. While he is in 
the story morally, his role is that of prophet or witness, not perpetrator. 
In the third passage, however, there is guilt, even shame, provoked 
by the recognition that in the face of pain ~ sacred pain, God's pain — the 
critic (here cast in the role of student rather than teacher) responded with 
fear. The story also reflects the critic's vulnerability: She is transformed — 
evangelized, changed - by the old black man who frightens her. Here, the 
critic is centrally implicated in the story she tells. She is made ashamed of 
her fear by the old man who transforms it into rage and disgust with (along 
with love for) a world that tolerates his suffering so self-righteously. 
My point in commenting on these passages of educational criticism is 
to show not only their emotional dimensions, but also the differences 
among them. Although all three critics are physically in the stories they 
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tell, the moral dimensions of that implication differ ~ which suggests to me 
that implication is not something critics can opt for or against, but rather 
something they own up to and integrate into our work to one degree or 
another, including not at all. The fact of implication is not a choice. 
Paula Rabinowitz (1991) also has helped me see the relevance of this 
concept of implication to the work of criticism. Rabinowitz reviews radical 
women's literary writing in the 1930s and comments on the significance of 
this writing (radical women's fiction) for the broader genre of depression-
era literary radicalism, and vice versa. The literary radicalism of that time, 
Rabinowitz says, "produced a discursive field through which intellectuals 
could stake a claim in the political arena" — a masculinized field that 
discredited women's voices, but a field, and so a place to stand, nonetheless 
(p. 25). 
I would generalize Rabinowitz's argument to say that all criticism, 
literary and otherwise, requires as much as enables the critic to "stake a 
claim" in the political, and so moral, arena. However, in light of Spelman's 
insights, the activity involved seems less that of "staking a claim" than of 
"claiming one's stake." It seems less the case that criticism enables the critic 
to respond to her theoretical constructions of the world than that criticism 
requires the critic either to affirm and deepen or to deny and evade her 
sense of responsibility in and for a world in which she is always already 
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implicated. The possibility of denial and evasion is real, and some of its 
forms are all too familiar ~ the pretense to moral autonomy of the 
supposedly earned and deserved "freedom to be academic," the flight into 
what Watts (1992) derides as the "linguistic leff s feeble politics of words" 
(p. A40), or retreat into the aesthetic pleasures of the elegance of well-
wrought theory itself. However, like the "marginal men" Freire (1990) says 
many would like to believe are "outside" society and needing to be 
integrated back in, critics, including those who often plead the case of these 
people, also are not "outside" but rather all along have been "inside" the 
same social structures that oppress and constrain (p. 61). 
This, then, is the path I have traveled in trying to gain some insight 
into issues of criticism and responsibility. Let me now try to pull all this 
together enough to comment on the significance of these reflections, 
deliberations, and unresolved questions for educational critics. 
Implications for Educational Criticism 
For educational critics to own up to the moral and relational 
dimensions of their work as well as to their implication in the injustice they 
(we) so often critique would, it seems, go a long way toward improving the 
quality of the criticism. On one hand, this is simply the only intellectually 
honest thing to do — and that seems reason enough. I want to go the next 
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step, however, and argue that self-implication makes for better criticism. I 
say this for two reasons. First, as Heyward (1989) argues, "liberation of 
anyone depends on the tenacity of the connections and coalitions we are 
able to forge together" (p. 3). And this requires honesty about the 
inequities and unchallenged privileges that live in our relationships. 
We must be willing to pursue, critically and imaginatively, the 
truths of our own particular lives-in-relation — the difference, 
for example, our race-privilege (or lack) makes to how we 
experience the world; the part played by our class, our gender, 
our religion, our nation, our sexual desires, and relationships 
(Heyward, 1989, p. 3). 
In quoting Heyward, I am suggesting not that personal, family, and 
psychological issues should be the focus of critics' work, but rather that 
critics with emancipatory aims must take into account the conditions under 
which liberation from suffering and injustice is possible ~ such as honesty, 
integrity, trust, and a willingness to try to set right what is wrong in all 
dimensions of life. 
Secondly, self-implication invites a relational focus that does not 
preclude but nevertheless mediates against such habits of thought as the 
one I discussed in Chapter 2, the logic and rationale of triage, which paints 
with a moral aura the horror of separating and dividing people into, for 
example, valuable citizens and surplus people or "us" and "them," our 
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friends and our enemies. For critics to avow or own up to their own 
implication in a world of suffering and injustice would, it seems, go a long 
way toward sapping the rhetorical power of educational criticism like A 
Nation at Risk, which encourages and plays into this way of thinking. 
What, for example, would this criticism look like if the relationship between 
members of the NCEE task force and those whom their policies would 
disenfranchise were spelled out? Such a move might also undercut the 
persuasiveness of such elitist and self-righteous criticism as The Closing of 
the American Mind as well as help ground more firmly in the real world of 
anguish and desire the sometimes disembodied and abstract criticism of 
texts like Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life. 
West (1991) suggests another important dimension of self-implication 
than the one I have emphasized (interpersonal sensibility) in urging morally 
and politically committed intellectuals to conduct "a wholesale critical 
inventory of ourselves and our communities of struggle" and to speak to 
the question of "what really sustains our faith in struggle and our hope for 
change in these barbaric times" (p. xiii). West's question about the nature 
of the hope that sustains intellectual work is implicit in Giroux's efforts to 
elaborate a moral theory adequate to the task of legitimating a citizenship-
oriented pedagogy as well as the democratic ideals it would serve. In 
framing the question so personally, however, West brings it home. West 
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urges us to ask not "How might we legitimate our work?" but "What do I 
believe?" or "To what do I witness?" 
This question is particularly critical for the work of criticism because, 
as Walzer (quoted in Chapter 2) argues, criticism without hope is pointless. 
[T]he critical enterprise ... cannot be carried on without some 
sense of historical possibility. Criticism is oriented toward the 
future: the critic must believe that the conduct of his fellows 
can conform more closely to a moral standard than it now does 
or that their self-understanding can be greater than it now is or 
that their institutions can be more justly organized than they 
now are (p. 17). 
Real hope needs to be distinguished, however, from the cheery optimism 
Christopher Lasch (1991) calls its "poor substitute": 
The worst is always what the hopeful are prepared for. Their 
trust in life would not be worth much if it had not survived 
disappointment in the past, while the knowledge that the 
future holds further disappointments demonstrates the 
continuing need for hope.... 
Improvidence, a blind faith that things will somehow 
work out for the best, furnishes a poor substitute for the 
disposition to see things through even when they don't (p. 81). 
Hope must be grounded in a serious, sober look at the world as it is. Any 
number of statistics can be marshalled to encourage such a perspective. 
These, however, seem particularly telling: 
156 
1. It is estimated that between 500 million and one billion 
people are hungry. Each year 20 million people, the majority 
of them children, die from hunger or hunger-related diseases. 
2. One child in every 10 in the world dies before its first 
birthday. Forty thousand children die each day (15 million 
each year) from preventable causes. 
3. Enough grain currently is grown worldwide to provide 
every person on earth with 3,600 calories per day (adult 
average requirements fall between 2,000 and 2,700) and ample 
protein. This does not include the added calories and protein 
from the many non-grain foods grown (Peterson, undated). 
And, at home -
4. Every year in the United States a million and a half kids run 
away from home. Many of them end up on city streets. Right 
now, today, there are some 30,000 kids living on the streets of 
New York City. Contrary to popular belief, most of them run 
away not because they want to but because they have to; 
because even the streets are safer than where they're running 
from.... Even so, they are not running to anything but death. 
Nationwide, more than 5,000 children a year are buried in 
unmarked graves (Strauss, 1992, p. 753). 
This is a broken world. 
My faith is that there is a value to naming the brokenness, to calling 
its various dimensions by the right names, to calling to account those who 
would deny the injustice that is both cause and effect of the brokenness, 
and to insisting that healing is possible ~ not likely perhaps or even 
probable, but possible. Integrating this faith into the work of criticism, 
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however, requires more than affirmation of possibility. The world's 
brokenness has meaning as brokenness only when held up against a vision 
of wholeness. Therefore, we need a criticism that evokes an utterly 
alternative consciousness — a consciousness in which what is can be judged 
in light of what ought to be, which is related to but not the same thing as 
the political question of what might be. We need a criticism that evokes a 
consciousness in which the culture's obsession with competition and 
hierarchy can be challenged to the core — a consciousness in which we are 
ashamed to be so driven by these destructive impulses to compete and 
control, often just for the fun of it. 
Evocation of such an alternative consciousness is partly a question of 
language. Educational criticism needs a language that helps us to feel the 
ache of not doing what we ought to do and to grieve the loss of lives, our 
own and others, lived in accord with the "demands" of the marketplace or 
the "requirements" of professionalism. "Real criticism," says Brueggemann 
(1978), 
begins in the capacity to grieve because that is the most visceral 
announcement that things are not right. Only in the empire are we 
pressed and urged and invited to pretend that things are all right ~ 
either in the dean's office or in our marriage or in the hospital 
room. And as long as the empire can keep the pretense alive 
that things are all right, there will be no real grieving and no 
serious criticism.... The grieving of Israel, perhaps self-pity and 
surely complaint but never resignation, is the beginning of 
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criticism. It is made clear that things are not as they should 
be, not as they were promised, and not as they must be and 
will be (pp. 20-21). 
We need a language of criticism that allows such grief to surface in the 
public realm — a language that creates a forum wherein we can 
acknowledge individually and as a people that we are not who we ought to 
be. We need a language that enables us to rally around something wholly 
other than hopes for a rising GNP or for a declining trade deficit. 
However, and this is important, such a critical language must speak to 
people where they really are ~ implicated, all of us, in a world in which 
some live well at others' expense, some speak and are heard at the expense 
of others silenced or ignored, and some gain the language and analytic 
skills they need to name the world but at the expense of others who do not. 
The pain of this reality — the pain of seeing what our lives-in-relation look 
like -- needs to surface in the public discourse. 
Spelman, for me, speaks to the psychological dimension of the shift 
in consciousness Brueggemann would evoke. Her purpose in comparing 
and contrasting the moral dimensions of the emotions of regret, 
embarrassment, guilt, and shame is, in part, to show that only shame 
evokes a deep-seated desire for change ~ for undermining privilege, 
including and especially one's own. We are moved to relinquish privilege, 
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she suggests, to the extent that we become ashamed of being the person 
that privilege allows and enables us to be — a relationship Toni Morrison 
(1970) lays out with piercing clarity in The Bluest Eve. Looking back on the 
year she knew Pecola Breedlove, Claudia MacTeer reflects on the moral 
dimensions of her own (and others') relationship to the poor, black, 
homeless, raped, and, soon thereafter, hopelessly disoriented girl who once 
was her friend: 
All of us ~ all who knew her — felt so wholesome after we cleaned 
ourselves on her. We were so beautiful when we stood astride her 
ugliness. Her simplicity decorated us, her guilt sanctified us, her 
pain made us glow with health, her awkwardness made us think we 
had a sense of humor. Her inarticulateness made us believe we were 
eloquent. Her poverty kept us generous. Even her waking dreams 
we used ~ to silence our own nightmares. And she let us, and 
thereby deserved our contempt. We honed our egos on her, padded 
our characters with her frailty, and yawned in the fantasy of our 
strength (p. 150). 
While the self-doubt of this kind of shame cannot ground a vibrant 
feminist politics, Spelman (1991) cautions, the privileged are unlikely to 
want to relinquish that privilege until and unless they come to see it as 
deeply disfiguring to themselves: "The degree to which I am moved to 
undermine systems of privilege is closely tied to the degree to which I feel 
shame at the sort of person such privilege makes me or allows me to be" (p. 
229). Spelman's particular concern is the injustice that lives among and 
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between women, and she says: 
I do not see how women who enjoy privileged status over 
other women (whether it be based on race, class, religion, age, 
sexual orientation, or physical mobility) can come to think it 
desirable to lose that privilege (by force or consent) unless they 
see it not only as producing harm to other women but also as 
being deeply disfiguring to themselves (p. 228). 
If Spelman is right about the relationship between shame and 
relinquishment of privilege, the implications for educational criticism (and 
pedagogy in general) are clear. Critics and teachers need to ask the 
question of under what conditions people can - are able to ~ see not only 
their own disfigurement but also its relationship to privilege. Under what 
conditions can such a lesson be learned? Within what consciousness can it 
be seen, and how can such a consciousness be evoked? 
Along the lines of Spelman's caution that shame is a necessary but 
not sufficient grounding for a feminist politics, I would qualify that a 
criticism that witnesses and confesses shame is not necessarily better than a 
criticism that "witnesses and confesses" regret. Although I believe shirking 
responsibility is far more common in our hyperindividualistic society than 
taking it on overzealously, all of us are not guilty of everything. At the 
same time, Abraham Heschel's (1962) understanding is important: 
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Above all, the prophets remind us of the moral state of a 
people: Few are guilty, but all are responsible. If we admit 
that the individual is in some measure conditioned or affected 
by the spirit of society, an individual's crime discloses society's 
corruption (quoted in Purpel, 1989, p. 119). 
We all are responsible at least in the sense of implication — hence the need 
to at least ask the question: Given my situatedness in a world of suffering 
and injustice, how can and should I respond? 
My concern is how educational critics have and might respond to 
this question as educational critics. Critics are, of course, first of all 
teachers - and, like all teachers, cannot escape the moral dimensions of 
their work. Critics always teach something about something. Wayne Booth 
(1988) offers the simple example of Aesop's "The Goose." Like all stories, 
this fable reflects assumptions about shared beliefs — beliefs on which the 
story depends for its effect but which also presumably are applicable to the 
"real world." Among the most important are these clearly value-laden 
assumptions, implicit in the story, about "the way life is." 
1. More money is better than less money ... since it would 
indeed be good fortune to possess such a goose permanently, 
without succumbing to destructive greed.... The loss of such a 
goose is unequivocal loss, just as the loss of "gold" (of 
possessions), even in many a modern story, must be taken as 
real loss if the story, comic or tragic, is to work. 
2. To value gold excessively is just human nature — no 
explanation is required for why the two "soon" wanted more... 
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3. But to value gold immoderately is not only imprudent, it is 
stupid. Though there is no clear guidance about the borderline 
between excessive greed and a proper sense of the worth of 
what we gold-less moderns call financial security, we are to 
believe ... that true wisdom lies in being grateful for small 
blessings. 
4. Greed will lead to other stupidities. The tale depends for its 
satiric force on our recognizing just how foolish are the means 
that the greedy adopt for their imprudent ends... (pp. 144-45). 
To teach this story uncritically is, of course, to teach the values 
implicit in the assumptions Booth lays out ~ something Purpel (1988) has 
been saying for years (p. 364). What I want to add is that to critique this 
story (and so its broader cultural context) without calling into question the 
values it reflects is not only to underscore them. More than this, to ignore 
the story's moral lessons is to enact a particular relationship — one 
premised on the notion that the lessons of "The Goose" are not pertinent to 
the critic's relationship with readers. This question ~ Given who I am in 
relation to you, do we need to bring up the issue of wealth and poverty or 
not? — comes with the territory of deciding to critique this story (and so its 
cultural context). Not to ask the question is, of course, to answer it 
negatively ~ and so to affirm the matrix of relationships that prevailing 
ideas about wealth and poverty sustain. 
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Conclusions 
I began this dissertation with discussion of the way in which a great 
deal of educational criticism trivializes the complexity of the social and 
cultural problems we face and that our schools reflect. This criticism, 
which accounts for much of the educational discourse in the public press as 
well as in scholarly journals, cannot tell us much about the work of serious 
educational/cultural criticism. We do, however, need to pay close 
attention to the kind of criticism A Nation at Risk represents — 
reductionistic description of our enormous social problems that would put 
our schools in the service of a brutal economic rationality. This criticism is 
important because it is both dangerous and rhetorically powerful as 
evidenced by its resonance with a broad public audience. Related to this 
strain of criticism is the equally important culturally-focused work of 
people like Allan Bloom — an openly elitist call to get back to the basics of 
the classics. Again, this criticism is destructive. It invites a consciousness 
of us and them — we who are worthy of a high-powered classically liberal 
education and they on whom such an education would be wasted. Yet, like 
A Nation at Risk. Bloom has a public following — in part, I think, because 
he speaks to real public concerns. There are problems in the public schools 
and in our colleges and universities as well. And Bloom speaks to this. 
We may not like his descriptions and prescriptions, but he takes on the 
164 
issues -- something, I want to argue, the proponents of critical pedagogy 
could and should do more of. 
This literature (critical pedagogy), I have argued, is the best 
contemporary educational criticism we have. Critics writing in this 
tradition offer often trenchant critique of the habits of thought implicit in 
the work of critics like the NCEE and Bloom, and attempt to link matters of 
schooling not with our most destructive fears and anxieties but rather with 
our highest ideals and hopes for a human community. This criticism, 
however, lacks the public audience it needs. Part of the problem, I believe, 
is that this criticism too often gets bogged down in methodological critique 
and theoretical justification of its aims and objectives — which are, I believe, 
to use Lasch's phrase, "poor substitutes" for the powerful and persuasive 
moral argument the society and culture so desperately need and that I 
believe educational critics potentially could provide. 
I have used as an example Giroux's discussion of how to legitimate 
critical authority, which comes in the midst of his call for an education for 
citizenship grounded in an elaborated moral theory and linked with 
democratic ideals. This project within a project (legitimating critical 
authority while espousing democratic ideals) can be seen as a reflection of 
the postmodern predicament: On one hand, there is a perception among 
growing numbers of people, it seems, that our world is in crisis — 1) that 
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the possibility of environmental destruction is terrifyingly real; 2) that the 
chasm between the haves and the have-nots threatens to unleash 
unprecedented violence around the globe; 3) that our technological genius 
is running dangerously out of control; and 4) that the AIDS epidemic 
threatens to wipe out whole populations. Both literally and figuratively, 
the AIDS scare points to the insidiousness of the crises with which we have 
come face-to-face: Danger lurks, it seems, in even the most intimate 
spheres of life. (And what has been our response? Primarily to run from 
each other and deny the scope of the problem.) 
Along with a growing recognition that our crises are real, however, 
there is confusion about how to speak of the moral good. As Michael 
Harrington (1983) has pointed out, the death of the traditional Judeo-
Christian God as a political figure who helped us figure out how we ought 
to live together, as a final arbiter on what we ought to be doing, has left us 
with little more than our multiple stories about what is wrong and what we 
consequently ought to do in response. Although there is general agreement 
that what is is clearly not what ought to be. we lack a language for the 
common, moral good — hence, the increasingly sophisticated arguments 
about which stories (whose stories) are best. In the contemporary cultural 
context such arguments, it seems, are almost inevitable. And amidst such 
arguments it is not surprising that legitimacy of critical authority itself has 
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come to be seen as what Giroux (1988b) calls "a terrain of struggle" (p. 74). 
My feeling, however, is that struggle on this terrain is not really very 
helpful, that it distracts us from the larger problems and crises we face, and 
that it bogs us down in what I have come to think of as theoretical fort-
building, which shores up the critic's own defenses but not in a way that 
serves the common good. 
Let me approach this issue from another angle. Walzer (1988) relates 
issues of critical language to what he believes is the central problem of the 
modern age, the connection between the many and the few ~ "specialists 
and commoners, elite and mass" (p. 4). He explains: 
The standard hope of modern radicals is that popular 
education and democratic politics will bring the critic into a 
closer relationship with ordinary people so that criticism will 
be more like common complaint. But there is a problem here: 
the struggle for democracy seems indeed to bring specialists 
and commoners together, but the ambiguities of success breed 
separation. The actually existing popular regimes, more or less 
democratic, seem to produce a class of critics in flight from 
their audience. Mass society puts a special kind of pressure on 
the critic, especially if he claims to speak for the masses. How 
can he speak authoritatively unless he also speaks differently? 
(p. 10). 
Consequently, "the choice of a critical language depends ... on the authority 
the critic wants to claim or thinks he has to claim in order to be heard" (p. 
11). Ironically, however, critics themselves "draw the line" between 
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themselves and others ~ a line they then "set out to cross" in and through 
their work of criticism (p. 25). And, I would add, in and through concerns 
with shoring up the legitimacy of their authority. 
I think this consciousness of competing for authority is part of the 
problem and that critics would do well to follow Freire's lead. Just as the 
contradiction between teacher and student must be reconciled before real 
education is possible, so too, I believe, must that between "the critic" and 
"the people." Raymond Williams (1968) speaks to this consciousness: 
[T]he culture of a people can only be what all its members are 
engaged in creating in the act of living.... A common culture is not 
the general extension of what a minority mean and believe, but the 
creation of a condition in which the people as a whole participate in 
the articulation of meanings and values, and in the consequent 
decisions between this meaning and that, this value and that.... In 
speaking of a common culture, one is asking, precisely, for that free, 
contributive and common process of participation in the creation of 
meanings and values..." (pp. 36, 38). 
From this perspective, the task of cultural criticism becomes not 
legitimation of authority, but "the removal of all the material obstacles to 
just this form of participation" (p. 36). Brueggemann (1982) also speaks to 
this consciousness in pointing out that — 
The educational task of the community is to nurture some to 
prophetic speech. But for many others, it is to nurture an 
awareness that we must permit and welcome and evoke that 
prophetic tongue among us (Brueggemann, quoted in Purpel, 
168 
1989, p. 110). 
Developing one's own powers of prophetic speech is a different project 
from nurturing a prophetic consciousness. Similarly, establishing one's 
authority as a critic is not the same thing as nurturing a critical 
consciousness — and may even get in the way of evoking such a 
consciousness. 
Despite the questions I raised in Chapter 3 about the applicability of 
Freire's thought to the American context, his insights are immensely 
valuable. As he has taught, real education must start with where students 
are. The implication of this for critics are two-fold. First, critics must speak 
in a language that the people they want to address understand and, 
secondly, must speak about the world the people actually live in. What 
worlds educational critics choose to critique matters because the particular 
world critiqued is the particular world in which "a stake is claimed" and in 
which the possibility of communication is opened up. It makes a 
difference, for example, whether educational critics critique the narrow 
world of the classroom, the elusive world of discourse, or the everyday 
world where real people live and where what Williams calls ordinary 
culture gets made. 
At the same time, Freire's insight about the problems of internalized 
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consciousness also is important and instructive. Telling people why what 
they think is wrong can be only so helpful. What is necessary is to evoke 
an alternative consciousness in which better thought is possible. This 
suggests critics need to speak to the public's best impulses — impulses to be 
more compassionate, caring, forgiving, just, and generous — and not (as do 
critics like Bloom and the NCEE) to the public's worst impulses — to 
compete, to draw lines between "us" and "them," to form hierarchies, and to 
forget (if not scorn) the weak and the needy. We do not need any more 
educational criticism that counsels people about how best to race to the 
high end of a sinking ship. Neither, however, ought we get distracted from 
the work of responding to the sinking of the ship — by, for example, 
preoccupations with issues of critical authority. 
I realize that I have come quite close — too close, I think — to 
devaluing all criticism not written for a public audience. Thaf s going too 
far, so let me pull back. Different critics clearly write for different 
audiences. I picture three general audiences: 1) like-minded scholars; 2) the 
segment of the middle class that reads the social criticism of people like 
Lasch, Bellah, Ehrenreich, and Lewis Lapham; and 3) readers of daily 
newspapers, which provide some semblance of a public forum, however 
subjected to the tyranny of the market. 
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My point is that the circle of like-minded scholars (among whom 
some excellent educational criticism circulates) needs to be enlarged ~ not, 
however, by initiating more people into a non-negotiable world of critical 
scholarship, but rather by inviting more people to participate, with the 
language they already have, in negotiating what critical scholarship should 
be. Freire's (1990) language for this is that of witnessing: 
The leaders' pursuit of unity ... [requires] witness to the fact 
that the struggle for liberation is a common task. This 
constant, humble, courageous witness emerging from 
cooperation in a shared effort [emphasis added] — the 
liberation of men — avoids the danger of antidialogical control. 
The form of witness may vary, depending on the historical 
conditions of any society; witness itself, however, is an 
indispensable element of revolutionary action (pp. 176-77). 
Although the form varies, all witness, Freire goes on to say, includes these 
elements: 
consistency between words and actions; boldness which urges 
the witnesses to confront existence as a permanent risk; 
radicalization (not sectarianism) leading both the witnesses and 
the ones receiving that witness to increasing action; courage to 
love (which, far from being accommodation to an unjust world, 
is rather the transformation of that world in behalf of the 
increasing liberation of men); and faith in the people, since it is 
to them that witness is made... (p. 177). 
What does it mean to center the work of social criticism around "faith 
in the people"? This question, for me, leads back to Eagleton and his 
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critique of literary theory. Eagleton (1983) concludes Literary Theory: An 
Introduction with the argument that the book "is less an introduction than 
an obituary, and that we have ended by burying the object we sought to 
unearth" (p. 204). Given the social constructedness of "an object named 
literature" and the methodological divergence of its critics, there is no way 
to ground "an object named literary theory" in either the object of inquiry or 
the methods of that inquiry. Eagleton's response is to acknowledge the 
inevitably political character of criticism and proceed accordingly. 
Educational critics need to make much the same move, but not exactly. We 
don't need to "bury" the concept of educational critic so much as to turn it 
inside out. The work of criticism, as Eagleton argues so well, is always 
political work. But it is also the work of situating ourselves — morally and 
emotionally ~ in the world. This is good work, work that's best when 
shared, and work that (like most jobs these days) requires really very little 
expertise. Perhaps the special role of the educational critic is to first come 




1. Here I am following the lead Jim Merod (1987), who consistently 
refers to criticism as work, for this reason: 
The word work ... is deliberate and deliberately polemic. It 
points to the intimacy between the world of everyday labor 
and that other world of intellectual exercise which seeks an 
essentially theoretical clarity. These worlds are not divisible, 
but their entanglement is not apparent without some 
demonstration. Whatever criticism amounts to in a world 
dominated by commercial and political rivalries that organize a 
distinctly aggressive order, a world in which the university 
plays the central role in the production of knowledge, it is a 
form of work (p. 1). 
2. Toni Morrison's (1992) exploration of how literature "has behaved 
in its encounter with racial ideology" helped me think about the dimension 
of criticism I am trying to explore: what the work of criticism does or 
means to the critic her or himself (p. 16). Morrison's question is "what 
racial ideology does to the mind, imagination, and behavior of master" ~ 
specifically, those who write literary criticism (p. 12). 
3. The National Governors' Association 1986 report. Time for Results; 
the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy's 1986 report, A Nation 
Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century: and the Committee for Economic 
Development's 1985 report, Investing in Our Children: Business and the 
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Public Schools, for example. 
4. Giroux (1988b) emphasizes that the category of transformative 
intellectuals creates a standpoint from which to critique other intellectuals 
who do not function this way: 
A view of authority and ethics that points to the importance of 
specific forms of intellectual work and practice ... provides a 
referent for analyzing and criticizing those intellectuals who 
have been reduced to either a technical intelligentsia 
performing a wide variety of functions in late capitalist society 
or those intellectuals who have become hegemonic intellectuals 
either unconsciously or consciously furthering the reproduction 
of the dominant society (p. 88). 
In critiquing Giroux's stance, I am advocating neither blanket affirmation of 
all intellectual work nor naivete about its political dimension. My effort 
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